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Abstract
Fiscal policy analysis in heterogeneous-agent models typically involves the use of
smooth tax functions to approximate present tax law and proposed reforms. We ar-
gue that the tax detail omitted under this conventional approach has macroeconomic
implications relevant for policy analysis. In this paper, we develop an alternative
approach by embedding an internal tax calculator into a large-scale overlapping gen-
erations model that explicitly models key provisions in the Internal Revenue Code
applied to labor income. While both approaches generate similar policy-induced
patterns of economic activity, we ﬁnd that the similarities mask diﬀerences in key
economic aggregates and welfare due to variation in the underlying distribution of
household labor supply responses. Absent suﬃcient tax detail, analysis of speciﬁc
policy changes  particularly those involving large, discrete eﬀects on a relatively
small group of households  using heterogeneous-agent models can be unreliable.
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1 Introduction
Fiscal policy analysis in macroeconomic models requires the incorporation of a tax system
that can approximate both present law and proposed deviations. One challenge is that
policy changes aﬀect each taxpayer diﬀerently. Early heterogeneous-agent models often
approximate the tax system using a single parameterized tax function that smoothly
maps household income into tax liabilities or eﬀective tax rates, such as those developed
in Easterly and Rebelo (1993), Gouveia and Struass (1994), Bénabou (2002), and Li
and Sarte (2004).1 While the recent work of DeBacker et al. (2017) builds upon this
literature by using a large number of tax functions, shortcomings remain: Functional form
assumptions for eﬀective tax rates and the imposition of smoothness on the tax system are
questionable approximations of the actual tax system that risk introducing counterfactual
tax changes and behavioral responses into the analysis.2 This conventional approach
omits tax detail which has macroeconomic implications relevant for policy analysis.
In this paper, we develop an alternative approach that incorporates the tax detail typ-
ically absent: We embed a tax calculator in a large-scale overlapping generations (OLG)
model that explicitly models tax provisions in the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) applied
to labor income. We model the present law3 statutory rate schedule, the standard deduc-
tion, earned income credit, the child tax credit, the home mortgage interest deduction,
state and local income, sales and property tax deductions, the charitable giving deduc-
tion, the net investment income and Medicare surtaxes, and the dependent care credit.
Unlike the conventional approach, we do not impose functional form assumptions on the
eﬀective tax rate schedules. Instead, endogenous household behavior generates deviations
from the statutory tax rate schedule either by employment choices, which could aﬀect
tax credits, or consumption choices, which could aﬀect deductions.4 This is important
because policy proposals may include many measures with potentially oﬀsetting eﬀects
on incentives which vary across households (Gravelle and Marples, 2015). Our approach
ensures that tax policy changes involving large, discrete eﬀects on a relatively small group
of households are not washed out as a smaller change for the wider population.
To demonstrate the importance of tax detail we simulate speciﬁc tax policy changes
with the internal tax calculator and alternatively with the commonly-used Bénabou
(2002) tax function. First, the tax calculator can target speciﬁc households aﬀected
by a policy change. Homeownership is a choice in the model, so if the home mortgage
interest deduction were repealed, for example, only households claiming that deduction
would experience an increase in their tax liability. Alternatively, the tax function would
shift for every household, indiscriminately. The second advantage of the tax calcula-
tor is that households have the opportunity to react optimally to the policy change. If
the deduction is repealed, renters who would purchase a house in the near future under
present law may continue to rent, or decide to purchase a smaller property. Under the tax
function, the extent to which households are aﬀected by the repeal is implicitly assumed.
We simulate two policy changes: (i) a ten percent reduction in statutory rates on
ordinary income; and (ii) an expansion of the earned income tax credit for childless adults.
1Non-smooth tax functions have been used in Ventura (1999) and Altig and Carlstrom (1999).
2Counterfactual tax changes may arise from speciﬁcation error, for example. Akhand (1996) provides
evidence of misspeciﬁcation for the Gouveia and Struass (1994) tax function.
3Our reference to present law includes those changes to the IRC from passage of PL 115-97, which is
colloquially known as the `Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017'.
4For an early discussion on the use appropriate use of statutory and eﬀective marginal tax rates, see
Barro and Sahasakul (1983) and Easterly and Rebelo (1993).
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We ﬁnd that both tax systems replicate the aggregate average and eﬀective marginal tax
rate changes that summarize the aggregate behavioral incentives associated with each
speciﬁc policy change, and that both generate similar policy-induced patterns of short-
and long-run economic activity. Despite qualitative similarities, we ﬁnd quantitative
diﬀerences in aggregates and welfare, driven by changes in the distribution of household
labor hours across tax systems. The labor response from some household demographics
deviates from that predicted by theory when using the tax function, because the function
can fail to correctly model incentives for all households. The tax calculator avoids this
problem. An implication of this ﬁnding is that while smooth tax functions may be
appropriate for general analysis of tax progressivity, such as in Heathcote et al. (2017)
and Holter et al. (2017), they are less suitable for analysis of speciﬁc policy changes. As
a result, quantitative ﬁscal policy analyses omitting suﬃcient tax detail may therefore
fall short of capturing within economic aggregates the idiosyncratic behavioral responses
of heterogeneous households, and therefore be unreliable.
2 Model
In this section, we specify a large-scale OLG model where market interactions take
place between households, ﬁrms, a ﬁnancial intermediary, and government in which
we embed a tax calculator to explicitly model IRC provisions that determine the tax
treatment of labor income: Households make consumption, saving, labor supply, and
residential choices. Firms hire labor and rent capital to produce a composite output good
that can be transformed into either a consumption or residential good, or a ﬁnancial
asset. The ﬁnancial intermediary takes in deposits of ﬁnancial assets from households
and allocates the funds to consumer and mortgage loans, federal government bonds,
rental housing capital, and productive private business capital, remitting the return on
this portfolio back to deposit-holding households. Federal, state and local governments
collect tax liabilities owed by households and ﬁrms, and make consumption expenditures,
public capital expenditures and facilitate transfer payments. While all agents have perfect
foresight regarding the path economic aggregates, prices, and ﬁscal variables associated
with a given policy, households face mortality risk.
The household sector is developed to exhibit heterogeneity along speciﬁc dimensions
so that the tax calculator can explicitly model the desired IRC provisions applied to
labor income. We include ex ante heterogeneity in age, labor productivity, family com-
position, and wealth endowments which imply ex post heterogeneity in residential choice
and tenure, as well as the path of lifetime ﬁnancial wealth. For the speciﬁcation of sev-
eral parameters and targets relevant for these dimensions, as well as for the internal tax
calculator, calibration of the model relies heavily on the Joint Committee on Taxation's
Individual Tax Model (ITM), which makes use of data from individual tax returns ﬁled
with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and compiled by the IRS Statistics of Income
Division.5 The calibration methodology is described in Section 3.
Exogenous population growth and technical progress are both present in the model.
The framework is therefore structured to be consistent with the existence of a Balanced
Growth Path (BGP), allowing for the application of stationary solution methods to com-
pute equilibrium. The trend-stationary form of the model consistent with a BGP is
speciﬁed as a dynamic program in Appendix B. Furthermore, since households face a set
5For a description of the JCT's Individual Tax Model, see JCT (2015).
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of decision-making frictions that generate decision rules that will be non-diﬀerentiable
over some subsets of the state space, we rely on a discrete state-space solution method.
The value function iteration - direct solution hybrid algorithm used to solve the model is
described in Appendix C.
2.1 Demographics
The economy is populated by J =| J | overlapping generations of ﬁnitely-lived households
where J is the set of all possible discrete household ages with a maximum age of J . In
each time period, a new generational cohort of households enters the economy while the
oldest generation leaves. For working ages j = {1, . . . , R} ∈ J, individuals in households
decide how much to work, save, and consume on housing and non-housing goods and
services. All individuals must retire by the end of household age R and continue to make
saving, housing and non-housing consumption choices for ages j = {R + 1, . . . , J} ∈ J.
Households are assumed to survive all possible working ages with a probability pij = 1,
and begin to face mortality risk upon reaching the maximum retirement age with the
associated conditional probability of surviving from age j to j+ 1 of 1 > pij > 0 until the
maximum age of J where piJ = 0 such that the household dies with certainty.
Following Fullerton and Rogers (1993), each generational cohort of age j consists of
discrete household groups, indexed by z ∈ {1, . . . , nz} ≡ Z, who diﬀer in terms of age-
varying labor productivity proﬁles zzj which are strictly increasing in j. In addition, we
allow households within each cohort of age j and productivity z to exogenously diﬀer in
family composition, indexed by f , which takes one of two discrete values, f = s for a
single individual and f = m for a married couple. In each period, J×nz× 2 structurally
distinct households are making economic decisions.
The initial population is normalized to unity: P0 = 1. The population grows exoge-
nously at rate υp. Letting ΥP = (1 + υp), the measure of total population at any time t
is then:
Pt = ΥPPt−1 = ΥtP (2.1)
Let Ωe,ft,j be the measure of household family composition f , age j and labor produc-
tivity type z so that at any time t, the population may be broken down by the measure
of singles and married couples by age and productivity:
Pt =
∫
Z
∫
J
(
Ωz,st,j + Ω
z,m
t,j
)
dj dz (2.2)
While the age-productivity-family demographic distribution of households remains
constant over time, the measure of each combination of attributes grows deterministi-
cally at the gross rate ΥP . Formally, the total measure of productivity type z, family
composition f , and age j of households at time t, relative to their measure at time t− 1
is expressed as:
Ωz,ft,j = ΥPΩ
z,f
t−1,j (2.3)
Note that integrating both sides of the above equation over age and productivity, while
summing over family composition yields equation (2.1).
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2.2 Households
Households have the objective to make consumption, saving, labor supply, and residential
decisions that maximize the present discounted value of their lifetime utility, where utility
is derived from consuming non-housing and housing goods and services, and disutility
encountered from market work. The optimization problem is formulated to permit a
single individual state variable for each household of permanent productivity type z and
family composition f , which allows for only a single intertemporal problem to be solved at
each age j. We specify functional forms that allow optimal quantities of choice variables
to be directly expressed in terms of the state variable. Combined with restrictions on
choice sets, these speciﬁcations mitigate curse-of-dimensionality problems that may arise
with the level of heterogeneity incorporated for purposes of the internal tax calculator.
Let V z,ft,j (yj) denote the value function representing the maximum attainable expected
present discounted value of utility for the remaining life for a household of age j, with labor
productivity type z, and family composition f at time t. The value function explicitly
depends on a single individual state variable, current net worth yj, which is deﬁned as the
sum of the beginning-of-period (net) stock of ﬁnancial assets aj and the owner-occupied
housing stock hoj . Given their current level of net worth, households optimally choose their
future level of net worth yj+1 and current market labor supply nj as those levels associated
with the choices of ordinary consumption cij, charitable giving c
g
j , ﬁnancial asset holdings
aj, rental housing h
r
j , and owner-occupied housing which maximize their instantaneous
utility function U z,ft,j . Utility is derived from rental housing and owner-occupied housing
in terms of a housing service consumption composite good hsj, and derived from ordinary
consumption and charitable giving in terms of a non-housing consumption composite good
cj. These composite goods nest each single good  and are themselves nested into a third
composite good xj  all in a CES fashion. Ordinary consumption can be obtained from
consumption of market-produced goods cMj or home production c
h
j . Leisure lj is obtained
from the portion of unitary time endowments not spent on market labor or non-market
labor nhj . Upon reaching retirement, individuals no longer supply market labor and begin
to receive social security payments ssz,fj .
We follow Gervais (2002) and Cho and Francis (2011) in our speciﬁcation of the hous-
ing choice problem, and assume that the two residential options are perfect substitutes
so that a household will either rent or own, but never both. As in the former work, we
interpret housing services as the household's stock of durable goods plus the stock of
residential capital to allow for households taking out relatively larger mortgages in order
to ﬁnance the purchase of durables. As in the latter work, households face a transaction
cost ξHj associated with changing residential status from a renter to a home-owner or vice
versa to limit the frequency of status changes.
So that households have an incentive to make charitable gifts, we assume a `warm-
glow' motive (Andreoni, 1989). Charitable gifts are made in terms of ﬁnal goods, and
are assumed to be received by agents outside of the model.6
Market labor supply operates along both an extensive and intensive margin so that
changes to aggregate employment can be broken down into movement of workers into or
out of the labor force as well as changes in hours per worker. The former component is
important because it has been determined as the primary driver of aggregate employment
6Alternatively, it may be assumed that charitable gifts are made in terms ﬁnancial assets which are
then spent on ﬁnal goods by the recipients. This would be equivalent to our speciﬁcation if it is assumed
that the recipients are non-taxable and operate costlessly subject to an intra-period balanced budget.
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ﬂuctuations (Kydland, 1995; Fiorito and Zanella, 2012). We follow Chang et al. (2011)
and specify indivisible market labor supply nj ∈ N ≡ {0, nPT , nFT} such that individuals
may choose between no work, part-time work, or full-time work. While somewhat re-
strictive, this speciﬁcation allows us to capture the observation that working hours tend
to bunch around part-time and full-time levels (Keane and Wasi, 2016).
Drawing from the observation that employed individuals spend less time on housework
than the unemployed (Krueger and Mueller, 2012), we assume that the time each individ-
ual spends on home production exogenously varies inversely with their chosen quantity of
market labor, so that the amount of home work is determined by the amount of market
work through the function nhj (nj). Since housework can largely be outsourced, we further
assume that all households derive the same value of home-produced consumption from
each non-market labor hour through the function chj (n
h
j ). Despite this simple structure of
home production, its incorporation helps to sustain heterogeneity in market labor hours
as observed by Kuhn and Lozano (2008): First, higher earning individuals in the model
tend to supply relatively more hours in the market than lower earning individuals. Sec-
ond, as households age and become more productive on the market, variance of the net
return to labor increases and drives greater variation in market hours at older ages.
Total costs to market work include a utility cost, a monetary cost, and a consumption
cost. Following Holter et al. (2017), single households face a ﬁxed utility loss of F s if
the individual enters the labor force, while married households face a ﬁxed utility loss
of Fm if the secondary earner works. The monetary cost κz,fj captures child-care costs
(Guner et al., 2011), and is a function the number of qualifying dependents within that
household, νz,fj , and the market work hours of the single or secondary worker. This
cost allows for the model to capture variation in lifecycle market labor and foregone
earnings due to child-rearing (Adda et al., 2017). Finally, deﬁning ordinary consumption
as the sum of market and home-produced consumption goods, our speciﬁcation of time
use for home production implies that households face a loss in ordinary consumption
which varies positively with market labor hours. Rogerson and Wallenius (2013) show
that such a consumption cost helps to replicate the mostly abrupt nature of retirement
observed empirically. The presence of this cost in our model can induce individuals of
diﬀerent demographics to choose full retirement at diﬀerent ages prior to the required
retirement age. Further, these features help generate the empirically observed extent
and intensity of labor force participation across diﬀerent demographic groups, without
imposing exogenous lifecycle variation in labor disutility, see (Cogan, 1981).
Consider a single individual. The objective of this household's optimization problem
for a known policy regime is:7
V z,st,j (yj) = max
yj+1;xj ,nj∈N
U z,st,j (xj, nj) + βpijV
z,s
t+1,j+1(yj+1) (2.4)
U z,st,j (xj, nj) ≡ max
aj ,h
r
j ,h
o
j ,
cij ,c
g
j
log(xj)− ψs
n1+ζ
s
j
1 + ζs
− F s (2.5)
where:
yj ≡ hoj + aj (2.6)
7While prices, taxes and utility are time dependent, the household keeps track of choice variables over
time using age. To reduce notational clutter, we omit the time subscript where able until aggregation.
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xj ≡
(
σcηj + (1− σ)hsηj
)1/η
(2.7)
cj ≡ (cij)θ
z,s
(cgj )
(1−θz,s) (2.8)
hsj ≡ max{hoj , hrj} (2.9)
nj =
{
1− lj − nhj (nj) ∀j ≤ R
0 ∀j > R (2.10)
F s =
{
φs if nj > 0
0 if nj = 0
(2.11)
cij ≡ cMj + chj (nhj ) (2.12)
The functional form for instantaneous utility in equation (2.5) is chosen because it is
consistent with a BGP in the presence of ﬁxed utility costs from working.8
All households have their feasible choice set restricted by a budget constraint: The sum
of expenditures on market consumption cMj , charitable giving c
g
j , and rental housing p
r
th
r
j ,
as well as the choice of the next-period stock of ﬁnancial assets aj+1 and owner-occupied
housing hoj+1, can be no larger to the resources currently available to the household.
Available resources consist of the gross return on beginning-of-period ﬁnancial assets
(1 + rpt )aj held by a ﬁnancial intermediary, the after-tax bequests received from those
who died at the end of the previous period beqt, the stock of beginning-of-period owner-
occupied housing less maintenance costs and economic depreciation (1 − δo)hoj , the ﬂow
of income iz,st,j which is equal to labor income njwtz
z
j during working years and equal to
social security payments ssz,sj during retirement. These resources may be reduced by net
tax liabilities T z,st,j , child-care costs κz,sj , and housing transaction costs ξHj . Formally the
budget constraint takes the form:
cMj +c
g
j +p
r
th
r
j +aj+1 +h
o
j+1 ≤ (1+rpt )aj +beqt+(1−δo)hoj + iz,st,j −T z,st,j −κz,sj −ξHj (2.13)
where:
iz,st,j ≡ njwtzz,sj + ssz,sj (2.14)
κz,sj = cc
z,sνz,sj nj (2.15)
ξHj =
{
φohoj+1 if h
o
j = 0
φrhrj+1 if h
o
j > 0
(2.16)
and ccz,s is an exogenous scale parameter for cost per child. The determination of net
tax liabilities T z,ft,j are detailed in Section 2.5.
Households are permitted to borrow and accumulate debt in excess of savings subject
to the following restrictions:
8See Holter, Krueger, and Stepanchuk (2017) for the proof of balanced growth path consistency.
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yj ≥
{
yz,s if hoj = 0
γhoj if h
o
j > 0
(2.17)
where yz,s < 0 is the lower-bound of the net worth support and the parameter 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1
can be interpreted as the down-payment ratio, or the minimum equity which a homeowner
may hold in their home. This condition implies that while renters are able to accumulate
unsecured debt up to the amount of yz,s, homeowners must maintain a minimum equity
balance of γhoj . Homeowners have access to larger loans, using their home as collateral
for borrowing up to (1− γ)hoj .
Both rental housing and owner-occupied housing are subject to minimum sizes, where
hr < ho making rentals relatively more aﬀordable. Similarly, ordinary consumption must
be at least as large as a subsistence level ci. We further assume that households do not
make charitable gifts if ordinary consumption is at this subsistence level:
hsj ≥ hr, cij ≥ ci (2.18)
hoj ≥ ho if hoj > 0 (2.19)
cj = c
i
j if c
i
j = c
i (2.20)
As discussed in Section 2.5.2, the federal government will provide a conditional welfare
transfer to any household that cannot aﬀord both ci and hr.
It is assumed that households enter the economy with initial ﬁnancial assets of a1 and
zero owner-occupied housing. Should a household live to the maximum age J , they are
assumed to die with zero net-worth. This is not to say that savings, aJ+1, equal zero at
the end of life, as owner-occupied housing capital could be positive, allowing agents to
die with mortgage debt. In this way, the model allows for reverse mortgages. Formally,
we impose the initial and terminal conditions:
y1 = a1 (2.21)
ho1 = yJ+1 = 0 (2.22)
V z,st,J+1 = 0 (2.23)
Married households face a similar constrained optimization problem to that of sin-
gle households. They make choices along the same margins to maximize the present
discounted value of lifetime utility with the following objective function:
V z,mt,j (yj) = maxyj+1;xj ,
n1j ,n
2
j∈N
U z,mt,j (xj, n
1
j , n
2
j) + βpijV
z,m
t+1,j+1(yj+1)
with the associated instantaneous utility function allowing for two potential earners:
U z,mt,j (xj, n
1
j , n
2
j) ≡ max
aj ,h
r
j ,h
o
j ,
cij ,c
g
j
log(xj)− ψm,1
(n1j)
1+ζm,1
1 + ζm,1
− ψm,2 (n
2
j)
1+ζm,2
1 + ζm,2
− Fm
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Married households similarly face equations (2.6) through (2.23), indexed f = m
instead of f = s, with the exception of equations (2.10)-(2.12) and (2.14)-(2.15). First,
equation (2.10) applies to labor supply for each of the married household's potential
earners individually, so that n1j and n
2
j denote the primary and secondary labor supply.
Each worker gives up the same quantity of home production hours to work in the market.
Second, since it is assumed that the costs associated with working apply only to the
secondary earner, we have:
nj =
{
1− lj − nhj (nj) ∀j ≤ R,  = 1, 2
0 ∀j > R
Fm =
{
φm if n2j > 0
0 if n2j = 0
κz,mj = cc
z,mνz,mj n
2
j
Home production and income depend on the labor of both individuals in a household:
cij ≡ cMj + ch,2j (nh,1j ) + ch,1j (nh,2j )
iz,mt,j ≡ (n1j + µzn2j)wtzz,mj + ssz,mj
where 0 < µz ≤ 1 is an exogenous productivity wedge between the primary and secondary
workers. Note that the secondary earner's eﬀective wage rate depends on the productivity-
type speciﬁc term zz,mj , which also determines the primary worker's eﬀective wage rate
given the prevailing market real wage rate wt. This speciﬁcation is intended to capture
both the observed earnings diﬀerential of workers within a married household and positive
assortative mating (Greenwood et al., 2016, 2014; Eika et al., 2014).
Finally, since households can unexpectedly die when aged R < j < J , they may leave
behind wealth that they have accumulated over their lifetime. Should a household die
before reaching the maximum age J , a proportion Λ of their net worth is allocated to
end-of-life consumption expenditures and the remaining (1 − Λ) proportion is costlessly
liquidated and collected by the government, taxed, and redistributed in a lump-sum
fashion among the living. While this speciﬁcation is chosen primarily so that the observed
level of aggregate bequests can be targeted through the value of Λ, it also captures
the observed increase in medical expenditures at the end of life (French et al., 2006).
Furthermore, our perfect-foresight assumption implies that all agents can predict the
quantity of wealth left behind by the dead, allowing for us to specify contemporaneous
redistribution in the following manner:
beqt = (1− Λ)
∫
Z
∫
J
(1− pij)
∑
f=s,m
yt+1,j+1Ω
z,f
t,j dj dz − T beqt (2.24)
where T beqt is the aggregate amount of taxes collected by the government on accidental
bequests left at the end of period t.
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2.3 Firms
Identical ﬁrms hire labor directly from households in a perfectly competitive labor market
and rent capital from a ﬁnancial intermediary to produce and sell output in a competitive
goods market at proﬁt maximizing levels. Production technology is assumed to be of the
Cobb-Douglas form:
Yt = G
g
tK
α
t (AtNt)
1−α−g (2.25)
where Gt = G
fed
t +G
sl
t the sum of beginning-of-period public capital from owned by the
federal government as well as the state and local governments, Kt and Nt are beginning-
of-period productive private capital and eﬀective labor units used in production, and At
is the level of labor-augmenting technological progress which evolves as At+1 = ΥAAt ,
where ΥA = (1+υA) is the exogenous annual gross rate of technological growth. The ﬁnal
output good Yt is the numéraire and can costlessly be transformed by households into
a consumption good, owner-occupied housing services, or a ﬁnancial asset as in Gervais
(2002), Fernánez-Villaverde and Krueger (2010), and Cho and Francis (2011), or into a
charitable gift.
Aggregate eﬀective labor Nt is the sum of eﬃciency-weighted labor hours:
Nt =
∫
Z
∫
J
zz,sj n
z,s
t,j Ω
z,s
t,j + z
z,m
j (n
z,1
t,j + µ
znz,2t,j )Ω
z,m
t,j dj dz (2.26)
where Ωz,st,j is the measure of each productivity and age group for singles at time t, Ω
z,m
t,j is
the corresponding measure for married households, and labor hours for singles, married
primary and married secondary earners are nz,st,j , n
z,1
t,j and n
z,2
t,j respectively.
Under this environment, the production sector can be modeled from the perspective of
a representative ﬁrm which has the objective to choose the quantity of inputs Kt and Nt
at factor prices rt and wt to produce output Yt at a level that maximizes after-tax proﬁts
each period, taking the stock of public capital Gt as given. Assuming that wage expenses
are fully deductible from all business-level taxes, proﬁts Πt for the representative ﬁrm are
given by:
Πt = max
Kt,Nt
{
(1− τ bust )(1− τ slbt )
(
GgtK
α
t (AtNt)
1−α−g − wtNt
)
+ τ bust lsd
bus
t − rtKt
}
(2.27)
where τ bust and τ
slb
t are linear business-level tax rates applied to taxable proﬁts at the
federal level and the combined state-local level respectively, and lsdbust is a lump-sum
deduction against the federal tax liabilities. State and local business-level taxes are
assumed to be fully deductible from federal business-level tax liabilities.
While the presence of public capital gives rise to economic rents, perfect competition
in the goods market implies that ﬁrms will earn zero economic proﬁts in equilibrium. To
account for this we assume that the ﬁnancial intermediary has suﬃcient market power
over the ﬁrm to extract this rent, which accrues to the owners of capital. Firms then hire
private factors at the given prices such that:
wt = (1− α− g)GgtKαt (AtNt)−α−g (2.28)
rt =
1
Kt
(
(1− τ bust )(1− τ slbt )(α + g)(GgtKαt (AtNt)1−α−g) + τ bust lsdbust
)
(2.29)
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2.4 Financial Intermediary
A representative ﬁnancial intermediary pools the net stock of savings chosen by house-
holds into deposits to be invested in capital markets. Beginning-of-period aggregate
deposits are expressed as:
Dt =
∫
Z
∫
J
∑
f=s,m
az,ft,j Ω
z,f
t,j dj dz (2.30)
Each period the intermediary pays households the principle plus a portfolio return on
their savings chosen in the previous period, (1 + rpt )Dt, and takes in new deposits Dt+1,
for which it decides an investment allocation. The ﬁnancial intermediary can invest in
productive private business capital, Kt+1, rental housingH
r
t , and government bonds Bt+1.
The equations of motion for these stocks are as follows:
Kt+1 = (1− δK)Kt + IKt − Ξt (2.31)
Hrt = (1− δr)Hrt−1 + Irt (2.32)
Bt+1 = Bt +NBt (2.33)
There is a convex adjustment cost Ξt for deviating from the `break-even' level of
investment that would keep growth-adjusted private capital per capita constant:
Ξt =
ξK
2
(
Kt+1
Kt
−ΥPΥA)2Kt (2.34)
Net investment in business capital and rental housing chosen by the ﬁnancial interme-
diary are IKt and I
r
t , while new bond issues by the government and purchased by the
intermediary are denoted NBt. While investment in business capital and government
bonds at time t yields returns (rt+1 + δ
K) and ρt+1 at time t + 1, investment in rental
housing is assumed to be immediately available to households and thus yields contempo-
raneous return prt . The intermediary incurs expenses from the economic depreciation of
their stocks of business capital and rental housing capital, as well as potential business
capital adjustment cost expenses. Table 1 summarizes the assets and liabilities held by
the intermediary at the end of period t, as well as their contemporaneous income and
expense ﬂows over the period.
The objective of the ﬁnancial intermediary is to choose the sequence of business capital
and rental housing which maximize their net cash ﬂow:
It = max
Ks+1,Hrs
∞∑
s=t
(1 + rs − δK)Ks + (1− δr)Hrs−1 + prsHrs + (1 + ρs)Bs +Ds+1
− (1 + rps)Ds −Ks+1 − Ξs −Hrs −Bs+1 (2.35)
subject to the resource constraint:
Ds+1 ≥ Ks+1 +Hrs +Bs+1 ∀s (2.36)
and the equations of motion for capital stocks, equations (2.31) through (2.33), with Ks,
Bs, and H
r
s−1 given.
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The resource constraint (2.36) states that business capital and government bonds at
the end of any given period plus current rental housing stock held by the intermediary
must be less than or equal to the end-of-period stock of savings deposited by households.
Given the objective of the ﬁnancial intermediary, the price of rental housing is set so that
the intermediary is indiﬀerent between investing in rental housing or business capital,
which yields the no-arbitrage condition:
prt = rt+1 − δK + δr −
(
∂Ξt
∂Kt+1
+
∂Ξt+1
∂Kt+1
)
(2.37)
We assume that government bonds, which are all held directly by the intermediary,
enjoy a low safe interest rate ρt relative to the return on productive capital. Since
there is no uncertainty in this model, we accomplish this by introducing an exogenous,
time-invariant wedge $ between ρt and rt.
ρt ≡ rt −$ (2.38)
Finally, noting the contemporaneous income and expenses at time t from the income
statement of the representative ﬁnancial intermediary above, the imposition of a zero-
proﬁt condition on the ﬁnancial intermediary implies that households receive a return on
their deposits equal to:
rpt =
(rt − δK)Kt − Ξt + prtHrt − δrHrt−1 + ρtBt
Dt
(2.39)
2.5 Government
2.5.1 Household Income Taxation
In this section we detail the tax treatment of household income, which involves the
speciﬁcation of a federal labor income tax, capital income tax, payroll tax, the special
tax treatment of social security beneﬁts as well as state and local taxes. We specify
the general framework of labor income taxation under the internal tax calculator (ITC)
developed in this paper and, for purposes of comparison, under the Bénabou Tax Function
(BTF) (Bénabou, 2002). Since the goal of this paper to demonstrate the importance of
the labor income tax detail contained in the ITC relative to a conventional tax function
such as the BTF, we use the same framework for modeling all other taxes regardless of
whether the ITC or the BTF is used in simulation.
To convert the household's economic income into a corresponding taxable income
concept, a `calibration ratio' is introduced to reﬂect the portion of a particular ﬂow of
economic income which may be subject to taxation. The productivity type - family com-
position speciﬁc calibration ratio for labor income, χi,z,f , and ratio for capital income, χa,
ensure the correct tax base. A household's adjusted gross labor income iˆz,ft,j , and adjusted
gross capital income rpt aˆ
z,f
t,j , are obtained by applying the corresponding calibration ratio,
such that:
iˆz,ft,j ≡ χi,z,f iz,ft,j
aˆz,ft,j ≡ χaaz,ft,j
(2.40)
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Equation (2.41) summarizes the tax liability for a given household. Net tax liability
T z,ft,j is equal to taxes owed on labor income, taxz,ft,j  which may be determined either
by the ITC or the BTF  plus tax liability on returns to saving, τat r
p
t aˆ
z,f
t,j , plus tax liabil-
ities associated with the Social Security system for retirees, τ prt,j iˆ
z,f
t,j , less federal transfer
payments, trsz,ft,j , plus state and local tax liabilities, slt
z,f
t,j .
T z,ft,j = taxz,ft,j + τat rpt aˆz,ft,j + τ prt,j iˆz,ft,j − trsz,ft,j + sltz,ft,j (2.41)
We now describe the speciﬁcation of each ﬁscal instrument.
Taxation of Capital Income and Retirement Average tax rates on capital income
are determined by age group - family composition speciﬁc tax functions: There is a unique
function estimated each for working single, working married, retired single, and retired
married household. We consider working-age households separately from retirees to more
accurately capture the observed diﬀerential in capital income tax liabilities, since workers
tend to save through tax-deferred savings vehicles. We assume that a household's average
tax rate on capital income is a monotonically increasing function of their asset holdings
relative to the asset distribution f(at|f, j), which is conditional on family composition
and whether the household is of working age or retired:9
τat = q
(
az,ft,j ,f(at|f, j)
)
(2.42)
We choose this speciﬁcation over one that depends on a household's predetermined pro-
ductivity type because asset income tends to have large variance over the lifecycle, which
raises the potential for a household to move in and out of several diﬀerent asset income
quantiles over their lifetime.
Working households pay into the Social Security program at proportional payroll tax
rate on labor income each period, which applies to all taxable labor income up to a
speciﬁed threshold. Retired households pay a proportional tax on their receipts of Social
Security income, which depends on the level of Social Security income itself. Formally:
τ prt,j =
p
(
iˆz,ft,j
)
j ≤ R
r
(
ssz,ft,j
)
j > R
(2.43)
Finally, we allow for taxes on accidental bequests left by deceased households. Since
accidental bequests are redistributed in a lump-sum fashion among all living households,
we specify that the tax rate τ beqt is linear in bequests and unrelated to either the benefactor
or beneﬁciary household's other income.
Taxation of Labor Income: Internal Tax Calculator Under the ITC tax system,
household tax liability on labor income, taxz,ft,j , is determined by application of a statutory
marginal tax rate schedule, deductions, and credits. This mapping from choice variables,
state variables and demographic characteristics to a tax liability is developed to be as
close to the actual IRC as possible for the provisions modeled. The eﬀective marginal tax
9Since all households receive the same return on their savings, rpt , and face the same calibration ratio
χa, an ordering of households by their ﬁnancial asset holdings is equivalent to an ordering by the taxable
income from these assets.
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rate on labor income is therefore not the statutory tax rate, but the marginal liability on
incremental labor income after these deductions and credits have been applied.
The average tax rate on labor income before tax credits, τ it , is determined by the
statutory tax rate schedule in the tax calculator, adjusted gross labor income iˆz,ft,j , adjusted
gross ordinary capital income krdz,ft,j , and deductions ded
z,f
t,j . Deductions are a function of
adjusted gross labor income, adjusted gross ordinary capital income, and tax-preferred
consumption choices made by the household. Credits crdz,ft,j are not only a function
of labor income and family composition, but of other tax variables as well due to the
refundability, or lack thereof, of various credits. Formally:
taxz,ft,j = max
{
τ it iˆ
z,f
t,j , 0
}
− crdz,ft,j − traz,ft (2.44)
τ it = τ (ˆi
z,f
t,j + krd
z,f
t,j − dedz,ft,j ) (2.45)
krdz,ft,j = k(r
p
t aˆ
z,f
t,j ) (2.46)
dedz,ft,j = d(ˆi
z,f
t,j , krd
z,f
t,j , h
o
t,j, c
g
t,j) (2.47)
crdz,ft,j = c(ˆi
z,f
t,j , krd
z,f
t,j , κ
z,f
t,j , ded
z,f
t,j ) (2.48)
traz,ft

6= 0 if nj > 0 and f = s
6= 0 if n1j > 0 and f = m
= 0 otherwise
(2.49)
where bold emphasis denotes a function. The last term in equation (2.44), is a pro-
ductivity type - family composition speciﬁc transfer payment traz,ft , which is used as a
non-distortionary method of ensuring that households within a given (z, f) demographic
group on average face a target average tax rate on labor income. This transfer may be
positive or negative for diﬀerent household groups, and is only nonzero for working house-
holds. Using equation (2.44) into equation (2.41) gives household tax liabilities when the
treatment of labor taxation is as speciﬁed in the ITC tax system. Under this tax system,
households consider the tax implications of their realized capital income when making
their joint labor supply and savings decisions.
Taxation of Labor Income: Bénabou Tax Function This section describes the
benchmark tax system for labor income that we use as a comparison to the internal tax
calculator, the Bénabou tax function (BTF). It is a commonly-used tax function (Bén-
abou, 2002; Heathcote et al., 2017; Holter et al., 2017) that generates average tax rates
and eﬀective marginal tax rates over income. Like other commonly-used tax functions,
the BTF is continuously diﬀerentiable,10 it allows for negative average tax rates to cap-
ture the eﬀect of refundable tax credits, and it is easily parameterized with the exogenous
speciﬁcation of an eﬀective marginal tax rate and average tax rate at the desired level of
aggregation.
The BTF takes the form:
10Other examples of smooth tax functions include, Easterly and Rebelo (1993), Gouveia and Struass
(1994), Li and Sarte (2004), and DeBacker et al. (2017).
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taxz,ft,j = iˆ
z,f
t,j − λf1 (ˆiz,ft,j )1−λ
f
2 (2.50)
where λf1 and λ
f
2 are parameters which together determine the income-weighted average
tax rate and eﬀective marginal tax rate applied to labor income at for each family com-
position. Using equation (2.50) into equation (2.41) gives household tax liabilities under
the BTF tax system for labor income.
2.5.2 Federal Government
The federal government collects taxes from households and ﬁrms to ﬁnance non-valued
government consumption expenditures, Cfedt , investment in productive public capital,
Ifedt , social security payments for retirees, and other transfer payments to households.
Budget deﬁcits are ﬁnanced through the sale of one-period bonds at the interest rate ρt.
Total government expenditures must be less than or equal to total tax revenue net of
transfer payments T fedt , plus new debt issues, less interest paid on old debt:
Ifedt + C
fed
t ≤ T fedt +Bt+1 − (1 + ρt)Bt (2.51)
where Bt is the beginning-of-period stock of outstanding one-period bonds. Total federal
tax receipts T fedt are equal to the sum of current aggregate federal net tax receipts from
households, T hht , taxes collected on accidental bequests, T
beq
t , and the current federal tax
receipts from ﬁrms, T bust , so that T
fed
t ≡ T hht +T beqt +T bust . The law of motion for federal
public capital is:
Gfedt+1 = (1− δg)Gfedt + Ifedt (2.52)
The budget constraint in equation (2.51) implies: (i) in a macroeconomic steady state,
the government rolls over a constant level of debt so that only ﬁnance charges ρB are
paid each year, and (ii) during transition paths, government debt may grow or shrink.
To rule out explosive debt paths, we maintain the no-Ponzi condition:
lim
k→∞
Bt+k∏k−1
s=0(1 + ρt+s)
= 0 (2.53)
which implies that the current stock of debt is equal to the present-discounted value of
all future primary surpluses along any equilibrium path.
Retired households get an annual social security payment ssz,ft,j from the federal gov-
ernment, which is assumed to be a function of payroll-taxable average earnings over
working years for their particular productivity type - family composition. The federal
government also utilizes three other transfer instruments: First, households uniformly
receive lump-sum transfers trlt, which are intended to account for a speciﬁed share of
current federal government transfers. Second, the government levies a lump-sum tax lstt
on households to incorporate those taxes speciﬁed to have only an income eﬀect. Finally,
to ensure that there exists a feasible choice set over the current net worth state space
given the presence of lower bound constraints on housing and ordinary consumption, we
specify conditional transfers trwz,ft,j for the purposes of welfare and housing assistance to
low-income households. Letting the right-hand side of the household budget constraint
in equation (2.13) be denoted with bdgtz,ft,j :
trwz,ft,j = max
{
0, ci + prth
r − bdgtz,st,j
}
(2.54)
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This means test requires a household both to be unable to aﬀord the consumption and
housing minimums, as well as have non-positive net worth in their next year of life in
order to be a recipient of welfare transfers.
From a uniﬁed budget perspective, net income taxes collected by the federal govern-
ment from households, T hht consist of labor and capital income tax liabilities less credits,
transfers and social security payments:
T hht =
∫
Z
∫
J
∑
f=s,m
(
taxz,ft,j + τ
a
t r
p
t aˆ
z,f
t,j + τ
pr
t iˆ
z,f
t,j − trsz,ft,j − ssz,ft,j
)
Ωz,ft,j dj dz (2.55)
where:
trsz,ft,j = trw
z,f
t,j + trlt − lstt
From equation (2.27), and the deductibility of state and local taxes, business-level
federal tax liabilities T bust take the form:
T bust = τ
bus
t
(
(1− τ slbt )(Yt − wtNt)− lsdbust
)
(2.56)
The federal government is assumed to collect all accidental bequests at the end of each
period, and redistribute them in a lump-sum fashion the following period after applying
a tax. Taxes collected on accidental bequests left at the end of the previous period are
therefore:
T beqt = τ
beq
t (1− Λ)
∫
Z
∫
J
(1− pij)
∑
f=s,m
yt+1,j+1Ω
z,f
t,j dj dz (2.57)
2.5.3 State and Local Government
Taxation at lower levels of government is incorporated both to account for their dis-
tortionary properties, for their deductibility from households' and ﬁrms' federal tax li-
abilities. For simplicity, we assume that household tax liabilities owed at the state and
local level can be expressed as a proportion of taxable labor income and owner-occupied
housing:
sltz,ft,j ≡ τ slt iˆz,ft,j + τ slpt hot,j (2.58)
where τ slt is a linear tax rate taken to represent potentially deductible state and local
income and sales tax and τ slpt is a linear average tax rate on owner-occupied property.
Aggregate household state and local tax liabilities can then be expressed as:
T slht ≡
∫
Z
∫
J
∑
f=s,m
sltz,ft,j Ω
z,f
t,j dj dz (2.59)
Aggregate business state and local tax receipts are:
T slbt = τ
slb
t (Yt − wtNt) (2.60)
where τ slbt is the state and local business tax rate and the second term is business proﬁts
from equation (2.27). Total state and local taxes T slt are equal to the sum of taxes collected
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from businesses and households: T slt ≡ T slbt +T slht . These receipts are assumed to be spent
on non-valued state and local composite government consumption expenditures Cslt and
investment in productive public capital Islt subject to an intraperiod balanced-budget
condition:
Islt + C
sl
t = T
sl
t (2.61)
where the law of motion for state and local public capital is:
Gslt+1 = (1− δg)Gslt + Islt (2.62)
2.6 Equilibrium
In order to exhibit a balanced growth path in steady state equilibrium, the model must be
transformed into trend stationary form. The transformation is described in Appendix B.1
and the model is respeciﬁed as a stationary recursive dynamic program in Appendix B.2.
Equilibrium for a given tax system is formally deﬁned in Appendix B.3 as a collection of
household decision rules that maximize households' utility subject to household budget
constraints, a collection of economic aggregates that are consistent with household be-
havior and the associated measure of households, proﬁt-maximizing behavior by ﬁrms, a
set of prices that facilitate clearing in factor, asset and goods markets, and an associated
set of policy aggregates that are consistent with government budget constraints. In a
steady state equilibrium, macroeconomic aggregates are growing at a constant rate equal
to the sum of technological and population growth rates.
3 Baseline Calibration
We specify that discrete time in the model passes at an annual frequency. The set of
parameters to be calibrated include both non-tax and tax policy parameters, both of
which rely heavily on use of the Individual Tax Model (ITM) for speciﬁcation, which
makes use of data from individual tax returns ﬁled with the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) and compiled by the IRS Statistics of Income (SOI) Division. We vary the use
of long-run historical data, recent observations, and projections to construct parameter
values in targeting the current economic environment and present (2018) tax law as
closely as possible for the initial steady-state baseline equilibrium. We attempt to make
the initial steady-state as comparable as possible across the internal tax calculator and
the Bénabou tax function by imposing the same calibration targets on each, the key of
which are summarized in Tables A1 and A2. To maintain focus on the tax details of our
model, we discuss the calibration strategy for non-tax policy parameters in Appendix A;
select exogenous parameters used are summarized in Table A3. The calibration of tax
policy parameters is described in the following section.
3.1 Tax Policy Parameters and Targets
We let households of working ages j = {1, . . . , R} coincide with actual ages 25 through 64.
and retired households aged j = {R+ 1, . . . , J} coincide with actual ages 65 through 90.
As discussed in Appendix A.1.3, we construct productivity types z = {1, . . . , 5} to rep-
resent a notion of lifetime labor income quintiles for both single and married households
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respectively.. Finally, we take the family composition f = m to coincide with married
households ﬁling taxes jointly and, take f = s to represent all single- and non-joint ﬁling
households. We consider the age of a given married household ﬁling jointly to correspond
with the age of the primary ﬁler.
This paper is primarily focused on modeling the taxation of labor income at the
household level. However, we incorporate the taxation of household capital income and
the business-level taxation of income to more completely approximate the federal tax
system's set of incentives and distortions, which are likely to aﬀect labor supply and
demand choices in general equilibrium. To map the ﬂows of income received by households
to their empirical counterparts, we consider: (i) gross labor income to correspond to the
sum of a NIPA-comparable wage income concept described in Appendix A.1.3 and a
(1 − α − g) share of pass-through business income, and (ii) gross capital income to
correspond to the sum of interest income, dividends, realized capital gains, and an (α+g)
share of pass-through business income. We consider the business-level tax liabilities to
correspond with those due by C-corporations.
The calibration ratios for labor and capital income, χi,z,f and χa, transform each
household's economic income ﬂow into a taxable base as speciﬁed in equation (2.40). We
allow for productivity type - family composition speciﬁc calibration ratios for labor income
to capture the variation in nontaxable labor compensation received by households over
lifetime income quintiles. These are set exogenously as the ratio of taxable labor income
to NIPA-comparable wage income as calculated by the ITM. There is a single calibration
ratio for capital income, which allows for the model to generate the desired level of
federal receipts from the capital income tax for a given speciﬁcation of the capital income
average tax rate function in equation (2.42). It is set endogenously so that aggregate
capital income tax receipts relative to aggregate output in the model's present-law steady
state equilibrium are equal to 2.04%, which is the level of total household capital income
tax liabilities as calculated by the ITM relative to GDP in 2018 as projected by the
Congressional Budget Oﬃce11 (CBO).
3.1.1 Federal Government Taxation Household Income
Taxation of Capital Income and for Retirement Since all households face the
same rate of return on deposits and calibration ratio applied to capital income, an ordering
of households by capital assets is equivalent to an ordering of households by taxable capital
income. We exploit this equivalence and specify an average tax rate function for capital
income that depends on the relative location of a household's asset holdings in the cross-
sectional distribution of assets, each for working single, working married, retired single,
and retired married households as in equation (2.42). These functions allow households'
tax liability on capital income, which may vary signiﬁcantly over their lifecycle, to be
independent of their permanent productivity type. We assume that this function takes a
quadratic form:
τat = q0
f
j + q1
f
j (a
z,f
t,j ) + q2
f
j (a
z,f
t,j )
2
These functions are ﬁt to the observed present-law average tax rates ordered by tax-
able capital income as calculated by the ITM for each age group - family composition
demographic. The functions are then mapped to the model-generated cross-sectional dis-
tribution of capital assets for each demographic, restricting tax rates to be non-negative.
11The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2018 to 2028, April 2018
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The average tax rate on capital income for a household is determined by evaluating this
mapping at their relative level of capital asset holdings and demographic group (f, j).
Taxes associated with the retirement system in our model include the OASDI portion
of the payroll tax, which ﬁnances the Social Security system, as well as special tax
treatment of the beneﬁts received by retirees. The OASDI payroll tax applies to all labor
income up to the threshold speciﬁed under present-law at a rate of 12.4%.12 The ratio
for the taxable base of adjusted gross labor income adjusts endogenously and uniformly
across taxpayers so that total payroll tax receipts relative to output are about 4.3%, as
is projected by the CBO for 2018. To accurately capture the special tax treatment of
Social Security income, the average tax rate on beneﬁts in equation (2.43) for retirees is
set for each productivity type - family composition demographic to match the associated
income-weighted average tax rates calculated by the ITM.
Due to uncertain lifespans, households will die leaving accidental bequests behind.
To account for the high end-of-life costs including medical expenses, some Λ fraction of
these assets will be allocated to consumption services. The remainder will be taxed at the
average rate τ beqt and then distributed uniformly to the living population. The parameters
Λ and τ beqt are jointly and endogenously determined so that average after-tax bequests
received by households are approximately 0.9% of aggregate output13 while estate and
gift tax revenue is approximately 0.12% of GDP, as projected by the CBO for 2018.
Taxation of Labor Income: Internal Tax Calculator The internal tax calculator
consists of a schedule of statutory marginal tax rates for ordinary income, deductions,
and credits, the latter two of which are functions of labor and consumption choices.
The statutory marginal tax rate schedule follows that speciﬁed under present-law from
the 2018 IRC, which allows households to take into account that extra labor income
or ordinary capital income could push them into a higher marginal tax bracket. Each
household's eﬀective marginal tax rate applied to labor income is determined by the
behavioral decisions made that imply deviations from the statutory tax rate schedule.
Using the eligibility criteria stated in the IRC, we construct the internal tax calcula-
tor to directly model the following provisions: the statutory rate schedule, the standard
deduction, earned income credit, the child tax credit, the home mortgage interest deduc-
tion, state and local income, sales, and property tax deductions, the charitable giving
deduction, the net investment income and Medicare surtaxes, and the dependent care
credit. In doing so, we explicitly account for any phase-in and/or -out regions of the tax
provisions, which could cause substantial deviation of the eﬀective marginal tax rate from
the statutory marginal tax rate for some households. To construct each household's ordi-
nary income tax base, we add a portion of taxable capital income to their taxable labor
income; the portion of taxable capital income treated as ordinary is set to exogenously
decrease over realized taxable capital income as computed from the ITM. Tax minimiza-
tion behavior is assumed within the tax calculator such that any provision which may
reduce tax liabilities is taken-up, including itemization of deductions (for state and local
taxes, home mortgage interest, and charitable giving) in favor of the standard deduction.
The number of dependents claimed by a household matters for certain credits. While
any qualifying dependent is counted for personal exemptions and earned income tax credit
12While in practice employers and employees each remit payment of half the payroll tax liability, we
assume the employee remits the full liability for simplicity.
13This number reﬂects bequests that are left to recipients other than a spouse on average in the US
from 1996-2012. See Wang (2016) for a summary of US bequest data.
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(EITC) calculations, the child tax credit applies to dependents under the age of 17, and
the child care credit and employer-provided child care deduction applies to dependents
under the age of 13. Household averages for each of these three kinds of dependents are
taken from the ITM and exogenously associated with each (j, z, f) demographic within
the model. For some calculations the frequency distribution for the number of qualifying
dependents within a particular household demographic is also used. The frequency dis-
tribution is especially important for modeling the EITC as it increases in the number of
children nonlinearly.
By incorporating dependents in the model, we create another source of heterogeneity
which has the potential to inﬂuence economic choices. For example, the data indicate
that young, single households have fewer dependents on average than young, married
households. If both young, single and married households would be in the EITC phase-in
range at the same level of earnings, the marginal and average tax rates will be higher
for the single household than for the married household as the EITC will be larger for
the married household given more qualifying dependents. If the EITC amount is then
changed for households with zero dependents, for example, then the single household will
be aﬀected more than the married household. The diﬀerential change to marginal and
average tax rates could induce diﬀerent behavior across these two households.
To impose discipline on the tax liabilities generated by the internal tax calculator,
we use productivity type - family composition speciﬁc transfers traz,f , chosen so that
income-weighted average tax rates on labor income generated by the model in either
the present-law baseline or in the alternative-law scenario, ATRz,f , match the income-
weighted average tax rate targets generated by the ITM, ATR
z,f
. The income-weighted
average tax rate on labor income generated by the internal tax calculator for a given
working household of productivity type - family composition is:
ATRz,ft =
∫
J tax
z,f
t,j Ωˆ
z,f
t,j dj∫
J iˆ
z,f
t,j Ωˆ
z,f
t,j dj
=
∫
J
(
max
{
τ it iˆ
z,f
t,j , 0
}
− crdz,ft,j − traz,ft
)
Ωˆz,ft,j dj∫
J iˆ
z,f
t,j Ωˆ
z,f
t,j dj
where Ωˆz,fj is a new measure constructed for this calculation which only weights house-
holds with positive labor income, therefore eliminating unemployed and retired house-
holds:
Ωˆz,fj =

Ωz,sj if nj > 0 and f = s
Ωz,mj if n
1
j > 0 and f = m
0 otherwise
(3.1)
Setting ATRz,f = ATR
z,f
solving the above equation for traz,f gives us the desired level
of productivity type - family composition speciﬁc transfer payments:14
traz,f =
∫
J
(
max
{
τ it iˆ
z,f
t,j , 0
}
− crdz,ft,j − ATR
z,f
iˆz,fj
)
Ωˆz,fj dj∫
J Ωˆ
z,f
j dj
(3.2)
Taxation of Labor Income: Bénabou Tax Function The Bénabou tax function
parameters {λf1 , λf2} are calibrated so that the income-weighted average and eﬀective
14Time subscripts are suppressed for steady state calculations.
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marginal tax rate for each family composition f , ATR
f
and MTR
f
respectively, match
those generated in baseline equilibrium under the ITC. Given the speciﬁcation of the
BTF in equation (2.50), the income-weighted average tax rate for family composition f
can be expressed as:
ATRf =
∫
Z
∫
J tax
z,f
t,j Ωˆ
z,f
t,j dj dz∫
Z
∫
J iˆ
z,f
t,j Ωˆ
z,f
t,j dj dz
=
∫
Z
∫
J
(
iˆz,fj − λf1 (ˆiz,fj )1−λ
f
2
)
Ωˆz,fj dj dz∫
Z
∫
J iˆ
z,f
j Ωˆ
z,f
j dj dz
where Ωˆz,fj is deﬁned as in equation (3.1). Setting ATR
f = ATR
f
and rearranging for
λf1 yields:
λf1 = (1− ATRf )
( ∫
Z
∫
J(ˆi
z,f
j )Ωˆ
z,f
j dj dz∫
Z
∫
J(ˆi
z,f
j )
1−λf2 Ωˆz,fj dj dz
)
(3.3)
Analogously, the income-weighted eﬀective marginal tax rate for family composition
f can be expressed as:
MTRf =
∫
Z
∫
J
(
∂taxz,ft,j /∂iˆ
z,f
t,j
)
iˆz,ft,j Ωˆ
z,f
t,j dj dz∫
Z
∫
J iˆ
z,f
t,j Ωˆ
z,f
t,j dj dz
= 1− (1− λf2)(1− ATRf )
Setting MTRf = MTR
f
and ATRf = ATR
f
, the above equation can be solved for λf2
in terms of only exogenous tax rate targets:
λf2 =
MTR
f − ATRf
ATR
f − 1
(3.4)
A Comparison of the ITC and the BTF: In Figure 1 we show the relationship
between adjusted gross labor income and the portion of household tax liabilities attributed
to labor income for both the ITC (top) and the BTF (bottom) in the initial present-
law steady state equilibrium. The BTF smoothly maps taxable labor income into the
associated tax liabilities, with the relationship determined by two parameters. The ITC,
on the other hand, is a non-smooth mapping that allows for sources of variation in labor
income tax liabilities other than taxable labor income. Variation in a household's taxable
ordinary capital income, number and age of dependents, and tax-preferred consumption
choices all aﬀect tax liabilities attributed to labor since key IRC provisions are explicitly
modeled in the tax calculator.
Diﬀerences between the two speciﬁcations are especially stark at the low and high
ends of the income distribution. At the low end, tax liability falls below -$5,000 for some
households under the ITC, but never falls below -$2,500 under the BTF. At the high end,
married households earning the same amount of labor income, about $355,000, have tax
liability ranging from $60,000 to $71,000 under the ITC. Tax liability is approximately
linear in adjusted gross labor income at this range under the BTF. In Section 4, we show
that the additional tax detail contained in the ITC has both macroeconomic and welfare
implications for tax policy changes that are not captured by the BTF.
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3.1.2 Federal Government Taxation of Business Income
We model a combined business sector without distinguishing between corporate and pass-
through production, when only the former ﬁles business-level returns separate from in-
dividual returns. To account for this, we assume that 73.44% of the combined business
sector represents corporate entities with the residual representing pass-through entities.
This ﬁgure is the average corporate share of total value-added in production over 2007-
2016 as computed from the Federal Reserve Bank Financial Accounts.
We take a linear tax rate τ bust to represent the federal eﬀective marginal corporate
tax rate, and exogenously set it to 73.44% of the respective rate computed to the JCT's
Corporate Tax Model.15 We then set the federal lump-sum deduction lsdbust endogenously
so that federal business tax liabilities relative to aggregate output in the model's present-
law steady state equilibrium are equal to 1.19%, which is the projected federal corporate
tax liabilities relative to GDP as projected by the CBO for 2018.
3.1.3 Federal Government Transfer Payments
A retiree's current Social Security beneﬁts depend on their past OASDI-covered labor
income through payroll taxes. Modeling this explicit dependence under the assumption
of full rationality requires households to consider oﬀ-equilibrium paths with respect to so-
cial security beneﬁts when labor supply decisions are actually made. Since this approach
would add substantial computational time, we assume that households are boundedly-
rational in this dimension and do not contemplate the eﬀects on their future social security
beneﬁts when making current labor supply decisions. That is, labor supply choices and
hence past OASDI-covered labor income are consistent with actual social current se-
curity beneﬁts only for the on-equilibrium path for each (z, f) household demographic
on average for a given cohort. Beneﬁts are assumed to be a function of average lifetime
earnings according to the beneﬁt calculator available from the Social Security Adminis-
tration.16
The purpose of welfare transfers trwz,ft,j in our model is to ensure there exists a feasible
solution at very low levels of consumable resources in the presence of positive lower bounds
on housing and non-housing consumption. These transfers are subject to the means test
in equation (2.54), which allows for a household without savings, and whose labor income
is not high enough to aﬀord consumption and rent minimums, to consume c and hr. The
lump-sum transfer trlt is uniform across all households and set endogenously to about
3.07% of aggregate output, which reﬂects the CBO's projection17 for the share of current
federal government transfers unrelated to transfers for OASI and Medicare, as well as
the outlay portion of refundable tax credits for 2018. Lastly, the lump-sum taxes lstt
are set endogenously to about 0.71% of aggregate output, which reﬂects the CBO's 2018
projection for excise tax liabilities and miscellaneous penalties.
15For a description of the Joint Committee on Taxation's Corporate Model, see JCT (2011)
16While in practice OASDI covered earnings from the highest 35 years are used in the beneﬁt cal-
culation, for simpliﬁcation purposes we assume beneﬁts depend on the full 40 years of working life for
households. See https://www.ssa.gov/pubs/EN-05-10070.pdf for a description of the beneﬁt calculation.
17An Update to the Budget and Economic Outlook: 2017-2027
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3.1.4 State and Local Government Taxation
We incorporate household state and local tax liabilities using the linear tax rate τ slt
applied to households' adjusted gross labor income and the linear tax rate τ slpt applied
the value of owner-occupied housing. The former rate is exogenously set to an eﬀective
rate representing the greater of state and local tax income or sales tax liabilities for
each tax unit as computed by the ITM for 2018. The latter rate is exogenously set to
0.0105× 0.7174 = 0.0075, which is the product of the national average property tax rate
computed using state-level estimates from the National Association of Homebuilders for
2010-2014, and the the average portion of total residential capital that is not consumer
durables as reported by NIPA for 2007-2016. The latter term in the product is included
to account for the face that our deﬁnition of housing services includes consumer durables.
For business-level taxation at the state and local level, we set the linear tax rate τ slbt
endogenously so that state and local business tax liabilities relative to aggregate output
in the model's present-law steady state equilibrium are equal to 0.38%, which is the
historical average state and local corporate tax liabilities relative to GDP as computed
from the National Income and Product Accounts over 2007-2016.
4 Policy Experiments
We demonstrate the implications of explicitly modeling tax provisions applied to labor
income by simulating two policy changes in turn: (i) a ten-percent reduction in statutory
tax rates applied to ordinary income, and (ii) an expansion of the earned income tax
credit (EITC) for childless adults. To this end, we assume in all of the simulations in this
paper that any tax provision set to expire after 2018 is instead permanent, including the
major provisions associated with P.L. 115-97 which are set to expire in 2026.18
Transition Analysis: We analyze the transition following implementation of alterna-
tive tax policy beginning from an initial steady state associated with present tax law in
2018. To compare responses across tax systems we report changes to key macroeconomic
variables over the ﬁrst ten years following the policy change to coincide with the `budget
window' used by the United States Congress to inform legislative decision-making. For
each tax system, the series are expressed relative to initial steady state levels.
Following the announcement and implementation of a policy change in `year 1', which
is assumed to be unanticipated in the `year 0' initial steady state, agents in the model
have perfect foresight regarding the future time path of policy and the economy. Any
policy-generated federal budget deﬁcits or surpluses are ﬁnanced by borrowing or used
to pay down existing debt for the ﬁrst 30 years following a policy change. Non-valued
government consumption expenditures and lump-sum transfers subsequently adjust by
equal amounts to maintain long-run ﬁscal sustainability, which is phased in over years
31 through 40, so that the Federal budget is balanced thereafter. A suﬃcient number of
time periods is chosen for the transition path so that the economy reaches a new steady
state associated with alternative tax law.
Steady State Analysis: We also compare the economic and welfare diﬀerences from
the initial present-law steady state to the alternative-law steady states across each tax
18See JCT (2018) for a list of expired and expiring tax provisions for years 2016 through 2027.
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system: Changes to economic aggregates and prices across steady states are reported as
percent diﬀerences from initial steady state to alternative steady state. In measuring
changes to welfare for households, we compute the proportional change to the lifetime
path of the consumption composite xj for households born in the alternative steady state
that would be needed to make them indiﬀerent between being born in either steady state.
For a single household this is:
J∑
j=1
(βj−1pij)U
z,f
j
(
(1 + ωz,f )xAj , n
A
j
)
=
J∑
j=1
(βj−1pij)U
z,f
j
(
xIj, n
I
j
)
(4.1)
where ωz,f is the proportional change in the consumption composite required to obtain
indiﬀerence between steady states, and the A and I superscripts denote equilibrium
choice variables associated with the alternative and initial steady states respectively.19 A
negative value of ωz,f implies that a household demographic (z,f) would prefer birth in
the ﬁnal steady state relative to the initial steady state. To compute changes to aggregate
welfare, we integrate both sides of equation (4.1) for both single and married households
over productivity type and age-of-household:∫
Z
J∑
j=1
βj−1pij
{
U z,sj
(
(1 + ω¯)xAj , n
A
j
)
Ωz,sj + U
z,m
j
(
(1 + ω¯)xAj , n
1,A
j , n
2,A
j
)
Ωz,mj
}
dz
=
∫
Z
J∑
j=1
βj−1pij
{
U z,sj
(
xIj, n
I
j
)
Ωz,sj + U
z,m
j
(
xIj, n
1,I, n2,Ij
)
Ωz,mj
}
dz (4.2)
where ω¯ is the aggregate proportional change in the consumption composite needed to
make the households indiﬀerent  on average  to being born in either steady state.
Finally, for purposes of our steady-state analysis, federal debt is held ﬁxed while non-
valued government consumption expenditures adjust to fully balance the federal budget.
The choice of this instrument over lump-sum transfers avoids the income eﬀect on house-
hold labor choice that would occur if lump-sum transfers were used to balance the budget.
In holding federal debt ﬁxed across steady states, we abstract away from the variation in
the extent of crowding-out (crowding-in) that may occur under each tax system due to
diﬀerent paths of debt accumulation (deccumulation).
4.1 Tax Instruments and Policy Changes
Both tax systems are calibrated for a policy change by holding constant income and choice
variables associated with the initial steady state present-law equilibrium, and adjusting
the tax instruments to target the ﬁve-year total conventional revenue eﬀect over 2019-2024
as calculated by the Individual Tax Model (ITM).20 Changes to labor income taxation
under the ITC are explicitly incorporated in the tax calculator, and transfers traz,f are
altered as needed to match the average changes to tax liability predicted by the ITM
19Since the consumption composite xj nests housing and non-consumption consumption levels in a
unitary homogeneous fashion, one can interpret ωz,f as the required proportional change in all nested
variables simultaneously.
20The conventional revenue eﬀect is the estimated change in tax receipts from those projected under a
present law baseline forecast, holding constant gross national product. See JCT (2011) for more details.
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for each (z, f) demographic. For the BTF, changes to average tax rates and eﬀective
marginal tax rates applied to labor income are made by parameterizing the tax function
to match those changes predicted by the ITM for each f demographic, with the average
tax rate change scaled as needed to match the predicted labor income tax liability change.
Changes to capital income taxation are implemented identically in each system. Equa-
tion (3.1) is re-estimated to match the changes to average tax rates applied to capital
income predicted by the ITM for the capital income quintile speciﬁc to the each (f, j)
demographic, as well as changes to the calibration ratio to match predicted change to
capital income tax liabilities.
To evaluate how well the aggregate behavioral incentives associated with a given
policy change are captured in each tax system, we compare the changes to aggregate
average tax rates and eﬀective marginal tax rates to the analogous changes predicted by
the ITM. In Table 2, we report errors for the changes to income-weighted average tax
rates and eﬀective marginal tax rates applied to labor income, holding constant present-
law equilibrium household income levels and choice variables. The small errors indicate
that both tax systems comparably replicate the tax rate changes predicted by the ITM.
Consequentially we have conﬁdence that both tax systems are calibrated well to capture
the aggregate behavioral incentives associated with each policy change.
Despite the identical calibration targets described above, the tax function deviates
from the tax calculator even before behavioral responses are incorporated. We highlight
some key properties of the BTF tax function relevant for our purposes in Figure 2, which
shows tax liability on labor income as a function of adjusted gross labor income for
single and married households before and after each policy change under the BTF tax
system, holding constant initial income levels. On the top panels we see that, due to
the ﬁxed functional form, instead of a strict shift downward in response to a ten percent
tax rate cut for all households, the slope of the function decreases at each point. This
implies a counterfactual increased net tax liability for singles earning less than $24,000
and married households earning less than $57,000. We see on the bottom panels that the
EITC expansion does not face this same problem; the tax decrease is mostly extended
to the targeted demographic - lower income single households. Nonetheless, the smooth
tax function cannot capture the explicit earnings thresholds associated with the EITC;
the ﬁgure shows that the single households above the earnings threshold (described in
Section 4.3) experience a reduction in tax liabilities. We show in the following sections
that these points are not innocuous: Each tax system produces diﬀerent labor responses
for both policy changes which can be traced by to these properties of the tax function.
4.2 Policy Experiment 1: 10% Statutory Rate Reduction
The ﬁrst policy experiment is a permanent ten percent reduction in statutory tax rates
for ordinary income  which include wage income, interest income, short-term capital
gains, nonqualiﬁed dividends, and pass-through business income. While a small portion
of the conventional revenue eﬀect from this policy is due to the change in tax treatment
of capital income, nearly all it results from the change in tax treatment of labor income.
4.2.1 Transition Years
Households respond to the rate reductions by increasing their work hours, although by a
larger amount under the ITC than the BTF, shown in Figure 3. While the initial increases
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in eﬀective (productivity-weighted) labor supply taper oﬀ under both tax systems over
time, labor hours remain higher than eﬀective labor supply under the ITC at a level about
1.7% higher than baseline. As this does not occur under the BTF, this indicates that the
net increase in hours is relatively more concentrated with lower-productivity workers on
average over the ﬁrst decade post-policy with the ITC.
In Table 3, we decompose the employment response across single, married primary,
and married secondary individuals. Under the ITC, single individuals move from part-
time to full-time, while under the BTF, they move from part-time to both full-time
and unemployment. Although the intensive margin movement under both tax systems
is consistent with the incentives provided by the policy change under analysis, we ﬁnd
the extensive margin movement under the BTF to be inconsistent. This particular em-
ployment change is most concentrated among the low-productivity singles, who under
the BTF, face the counterfactual increase in tax liabilities (explained in Section 4.1).
Married primary workers show some modest movement from part-time to full-time un-
der both systems, while married secondary workers exhibit the largest movement into
full-time employment as they move from both unemployment and part-time work. As a
household, married individuals increase hours by a relatively more under the ITC.
While the two tax systems exhibit qualitatively similar patterns of expanded economic
activity following the tax cut, there are quantitative diﬀerences present throughout the
transition across other aggregates as a result of variation in the employment response
of households: Following the larger increase in eﬀective labor supply under the ITC,
ﬁrms observe a higher marginal product of capital and respond by increasing their use of
capital and producing more output. This accumulation of capital happens at the expense
of housing and market consumption of households. Capital accumulation tapers oﬀ over
the ﬁrst decade as public debt begins to crowd-out private capital. As relatively larger
taxable income bases result under the ITC than the BTF, the federal tax revenue loss is
smaller under the former tax system, which results in a smaller accumulation of public
debt over the ﬁrst decade.
4.2.2 Steady State Comparison
A comparison of select aggregates across steady stats is shown in the two left columns
of Table 4 for each tax system. As with the transition path, both tax systems exhibit a
similar pattern of expanded macroeconomic activity, but with diﬀerent magnitudes: The
increase in eﬀective labor supply from the rate reduction is larger in the ITC than in
the BTF. This results in relatively more business capital, output, and taxable bases that
mitigate the federal tax revenue loss. Since budget short-falls are completely ﬁnanced by a
reduction in non-valued government consumption in the alternative steady state, private
capital is not crowded-out by public accumulation. The increase in deposits which ﬁnance
private capital formation earn households a return that allows for increased housing and
market consumption.
Unlike the transition path, the alternative steady state has reduced labor hours, even
though eﬀective labor supply is higher. This implies that there is a suﬃciently large
net increase in the labor hours of high-productivity workers oﬀsetting the decrease in
hours of other workers from an income eﬀect. Despite this qualitative similarity, the
source of declining labor hours diﬀers across tax systems. The most signiﬁcant diﬀerence
is among single households, where net labor hours decline only under the BTF. Nearly
two percentage points of individuals working part-time in the initial steady state leave
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the labor force under the alternative steady state. This change, as in the transition
path, is partially due to the counterfactual increase in tax liabilities associated with the
properties of the tax function for this policy change. Married primary individuals under
both tax systems enjoy more leisure by switching to part-time work in the years before
retirement, decreasing full-time work. While some (mostly lower-productivity) secondary
earners also switch from full-time to part-time work close to retirement, other (mostly
higher-productivity) secondary earners move into full-time work from part-time during
middle working-age years. While in the transition path the substitution eﬀect dominates
for lower-productivity individuals, the increased strength of the income eﬀect is apparent
in the alternative steady state.
Table 5 reports the percent change in lifetime consumption in the alternative steady
state that would be needed to make households indiﬀerent to being born in the initial
steady state. At the aggregate level, the ITC exhibits a relatively larger welfare improve-
ment than the BTF, with respective consumption equivalent variation (CEV) of -0.7%
and -0.5%. The source of this diﬀerence in aggregate welfare improvements can be traced
to diﬀerences in CEV by productivity-type. For both single and married households of
the ﬁrst productivity type in particular, there is a substantial welfare loss from the pol-
icy change under the BTF but a small welfare improvement under the ITC. Since these
households are largely unaﬀected directly from the tax changes, we ﬁnd the result under
the BTF an artifact of the counterfactual tax liability increase at low-income levels asso-
ciated with the tax function. Outside of these low-income levels, welfare improvements
are comparable across tax systems.
4.3 Policy Experiment 2: Expansion of EITC
We simulate a permanent expansion of the EITC that increases the maximum credit
and changes the phase-in and phase-out regions for low-income, childless households. In
particular, the maximum credit is increased from its 2018 value of $519 to $2,000 for
both single and married childless households. The credit, which remains fully refundable,
is completely phased-in for households of either family composition at a labor income
level of $10,180. It begins to phase out at labor income levels of $16,250 and $21,930 for
single and married households respectively, becoming completely phased-out at $32,750
and $38,430. The expanded schedule is shown graphically in Figure 4, juxtaposed against
the present law schedule for childless households and households with one child.
Single individuals account for most of the conventional revenue eﬀect both because
they are more likely to be childless than married couples and because they fall within
the income range to qualify for the expanded credit. Under the present-law sched-
ule, the lowest-productivity single workers are the primary credit recipients. Under the
alternative-law schedule, holding constant initial labor income, the lowest three produc-
tivity types would largely qualify for the credit with the fourth productivity type qual-
ifying only at younger and older ages due to lifecycle patterns of dependents and labor
productivity. While the lowest productivity singles would be located along the phase-
in region of the alternative-law schedule, the second through fourth productivity types
would be on the ﬂat or phase-out region of the schedule and further from the maximum
credit region as their income rises. This initial positioning around the alternative-law
schedule creates an incentive for these individuals to change their labor hours and hence
labor income towards the maximum credit region.21
21It has been documented that the Earned Income Tax Credit is associated with substantial overclaims
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4.3.1 Transition Years
The implications of explicitly modeling this policy change, targeted at speciﬁc taxpayers,
are visualized in Figure 5. We decompose the employment response among single workers
across productivity types for the ITC (top) and the BTF (bottom). Consistent with Eissa
and Liebman (1996), we ﬁnd that for both tax systems single workers exhibit an extensive
margin movement into the labor force over the ﬁrst ﬁve years following the credit expan-
sion, even as the cost of participation includes forgone home production (Gelber and
Mitchell, 2012). Along the intensive margin, however, we ﬁnd that under the BTF net
movement out of full-time work dominates net movement out of part-time work, decreas-
ing labor hours among singles. The ITC instead exhibits a response where the movement
out of part-time work dominates along the intensive margin, increasing labor hours in a
manner consistent with the ﬁndings of Chetty et al. (2013). While high-productivity sin-
gles show nearly zero movement in employment for the ITC, their employment response
is substantial under the BTF. Since this group earns labor income well above the credit
eligibility threshold, we ﬁnd the response under the BTF counterfactual to the policy.
Due to a greater extent of employment changes to take advantage of the expanded
credit, the loss in federal tax revenue is greater under the ITC on overage over the
ﬁrst decade following the policy change, as shown in Figure 6. While eﬀective labor
supply is up more under the ITC, the substantially larger increase in hours indicates that
the increase in labor supply is more low-productivity-driven. This underlying diﬀerence
persists over the ﬁrst decade of the new policy, as cumulative deﬁcits generate a relatively
larger increase in federal debt held by the public. As a result, public debt accumulation
begins to crowd out private capital accordingly in each tax system over the second ﬁve
years. Firms in both tax systems respond to the increasing rental price of private capital
by using less in production, which in turn decreases output and the demand for labor
input over the second ﬁve years.
4.3.2 Steady State Comparison
Changes to select aggregates across steady states are reported in the right column of Table
4. Output is only marginally diﬀerent across steady states for both tax systems, while
the stock of household savings and business capital remain approximately unchanged.
However, similarly small decreases in eﬀective market labor supply coinciding with large
diﬀerences in market labor hours imply substantial variation in demographic responses
across tax systems. Under the ITC, the increase in labor hours of 0.4% is indicative of
a substantial increase in labor hours by low-productivity workers outweighing a decrease
in labor hours of middle-productivity workers. This contrasts with the response under
the BTF, where the net change in labor hours of -0.4% reﬂects a relatively small increase
in labor hours by low-productivity individuals that is more than oﬀset by a decrease in
labor hours of middle-productivity individuals. This negative net change in labor hours is
inconsistent with the general ﬁndings of the literature, which suggests a resulting positive
net hours response when considering all margins of labor adjustment simultaneously.22
Under both tax systems, the small increase in housing and market consumption is driven
(IRS, 2014) and incomplete take-up (Plueger, 2009), which in dollar terms have oﬀsetting eﬀects on total
credit outlays. Nonetheless, we assume full-compliance and take-up in our simulations so that the ITC
and BTF tax systems can analyzed in a comparable fashion.
22See Nichols and Rothstein (2016) for a recent survey of the literature on labor supply and the EITC.
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by low-productivity single workers who generally increase labor hours. The relatively
larger response for the ITC reﬂects the larger increase in labor hours of these workers.
We report the consumption equivalent variation (CEV) in Table 6 to show the extent
to which the diﬀerent behavioral responses are captured in changes to household welfare
across steady states. At the aggregate level, the ITC tax system exhibits an average
welfare improvement smaller than the BTF tax system, with CEV of -0.2% and -0.7%
respectively. To determine the source of this non-negligible diﬀerence in welfare improve-
ment across tax systems, we examine the CEV by family-type and productivity-group.
First, consistent with the notion that this particular policy change leaves most married
households unaﬀected directly, we observe that married households have welfare changes
that are substantially below that of single households. Second, as the largest beneﬁciaries
of the expanded credit are the lowest two productivity-type singles for both tax systems,
we observe similarly large welfare improvements among this demographic. However, we
ﬁnd the diﬀerence among the third and fourth productivity-type single households the
most striking as the primary source of aggregate CEV diﬀerences, as the welfare improve-
ment for the BTF is substantially larger than that of the ITC. Since the measure of third
and fourth productivity singles who have income levels below the eligibility threshold is
small, this result reﬂects the inability of the BTF to capture the discrete nature of this
policy with a smooth approximation. Relative to the ITC, the result is an overstatement
of welfare improvement suﬃciently strong to aﬀect the CEV at the aggregate level.
5 Conclusion
Since heterogeneous-agent models have become relatively common tools for macroeco-
nomic analysis of ﬁscal policy, we have examined the extent to which incorporating ex-
plicit tax detail within an internal tax calculator is advantageous relative to the con-
ventional use of a smooth tax function for the tax treatment of labor income. In the
context of a large-scale OLG model, we have found that the ability of the tax calculator
to target speciﬁc households aﬀected by a policy change, and to allow for households' tax
liabilities to result from optimal behavioral responses in lieu of assigning eﬀective rates
according to a ﬁxed function, both have macroeconomic implications. In particular, the
quantitative diﬀerences in policy-induced economic activity arising from the use of the in-
ternal tax calculator over a smooth tax function are due to diﬀerences in household labor
hours responses across the two alternative tax treatments. We ﬁnd that labor responses
that are counterintuitive to the policy change are due to counterfactual rate changes for
some households when using the tax function. An implication of this ﬁnding is that while
smooth tax functions may be appropriate for general analysis of tax progessivity, they are
less suitable for analysis of speciﬁc policy changes. Consequentially, ﬁscal policy analysis
of targeted tax changes using heterogeneous-agent models in the absence of suﬃcient tax
detail may be unreliable.
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6 Tables and Figures
Table 1: Financial Intermediary Balance Sheet and Income Statement
Assets Liabilities Income Expenses
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Table 2: Absolute Errors for Aggregate Tax Rates Changes on Labor Income
ITC BTF ITC BTF
Rate Reduction EITC Expansion
Average Tax Rate Error (%) 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.13
Eﬀective Marginal Tax Rate Error (%) 0.13 0.00 0.06 0.00
All errors expressed as absolute percentage point diﬀerences from ITM rate change
Table 3: Rate Reduction: Percentage Point Change in Employment Status by
Worker Type - Average Over First Ten Years of New Policy
ITC BTF ITC BTF ITC BTF
Single Primary Married Primary Married Secondary
Unemployed 0.0 1.5 0.0 0.0 -1.1 -2.1
Part-Time -1.5 -3.1 -0.6 -0.2 -3.9 -1.2
Full-Time 1.5 1.5 0.6 0.2 5.0 3.3
30
Table 4: Steady State Comparison
ITC BTF ITC BTF
Aggregates (%) Rate Reduction EITC Expansion
Output 1.2 0.8 -0.1 -0.2
Business Capital Stock 1.7 1.2 0.0 0.0
Eﬀective Labor Supply 1.0 0.6 -0.2 -0.3
Labor Hours -0.1 -0.5 0.4 -0.4
Market Consumption 1.7 1.3 0.1 0.0
Housing Service Consumption 1.6 1.4 0.2 0.1
Federal Tax Revenue -3.0 -3.2 -1.1 -0.9
Deposits 3.2 2.5 0.0 0.0
All variables are expressed as percent diﬀerences across steady states
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Table 5: CEV (%) for Rate Reduction
ITC BTF ITC BTF
Productivity Single Households Married Households
1 -0.1 1.0 -0.2 1.0
2 -0.0 0.1 -0.6 -0.2
3 -0.5 -0.3 -0.9 -0.7
4 -1.1 -0.8 -1.3 -1.2
5 -1.6 -1.5 -2.4 -2.4
ITC BTF
Aggregate -0.7 -0.5
Table 6: CEV (%) for EITC Expansion
ITC BTF ITC BTF
Productivity Single Households Married Households
1 -1.3 -1.5 -0.2 -0.2
2 -1.7 -1.4 0.1 -0.1
3 -0.1 -1.1 -0.1 -0.0
4 -0.0 -0.5 -0.1 -0.1
5 -0.1 0.2 -0.1 -0.0
ITC BTF
Aggregate -0.2 -0.7
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Figure 1: Labor Income and Tax Liabilities: Internal Tax Calculator vs. Tax Function
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Figure 2: Labor Income and Tax Liabilities: Policy Changes with the Tax Function
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Figure 3: Rate Cut: Aggregates During Transition Relative to Initial Steady State
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Figure 4: Policy Experiment: EITC Expansion
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Figure 5: EITC Expansion: Percentage Point Change in Employment Status by Produc-
tivity Type for Single Households - Average Over First Five Years of New Policy
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Figure 6: EITC Expansion: Aggregates During Transition Relative to Initial Steady State
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A Calibration
A.1 Non-Tax Policy Parameter Values and Targets
A.1.1 Demographics
Discrete time in the model passes at an annual frequency. At the end of each period,
all individuals aged j = R = 40 retire and begin to face mortality risk while those aged
j = J = 66 die with certainty. Model age j = 1 is set to correspond with actual age 25 so
that model age j = 40 corresponds with actual age 64, and model age j = 66 corresponds
with actual age 90.
The population growth rate is set to υP = 0.0075, which is the average annual U.S.
population growth rate projected by the Census Bureau for years 2018-2028. The rate
of technological progress is set so that the steady state growth rate of aggregate output
is equivalent to the average annual real GDP growth rate of 1.93% projected by the
Congressional Budget Oﬃce1 (CBO) for years 2018-2028. Since aggregate output grows
at rate υP + υA in a macroeconomic steady state, we set υA = 0.0118.
Conditional survival probabilities pij are set to pij = 1 for ages j < R, as households
in the model only begin to face mortality risk upon retirement. We calibrate the latter
conditional survival probabilities using the Social Security Administration's 2013 Actu-
arial Life Table. We compute a weighted average over males and females for each given
age to obtain a single age-variant series which we apply to all households.
The measure of households Ωz,fj is constructed in four steps.
2 First, given the constant
rate of population growth and time-invariant mortality, we construct a stationary age
proﬁle of households as Ωj+1 = (Ωjpij)/Υ
P . Next, the joint density Ωfj is constructed
directly by computing the shares of joint and non-joint tax units out of total units over
each age 25 through 90 projected for 2018 using the ITM. Third, the density Ωz is
constructed independently of age and family composition under the assumption that the
mass of each age - family composition group is equivalent for each of the nz productivity
types, which implies Ωz = 1/nz ∀z ∈ Z.3 Finally, Ωz,fj = ΩfjΩz is normalized to have the
property: ∫
J
∫
Z
∑
f=s,m
Ωz,fj = 1
A.1.2 Firm Production Technology and Housing
To calculate the share of output in production for private and public capital respectively,
we borrow from the method of Cooley and Prescott (1995) which allocates the ambigu-
ous components of aggregate income in proportion to each factor's share in measured
output.4'5 Using data from the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) of the
1Unless otherwise indicated, projections from the Congressional Budget Oﬃce are from The Budget
and Economic Outlook: 2018 to 2028, April 2018
2The time subscript is omitted for a cleaner exposition.
3This is a natural assumption because, as described in Section A.1.3, productivity groups will be
taken to represent lifetime labor income quintiles.
4While Cooley and Prescott (1995) calculate factor income share of GNP, we follow their methodology
to instead calculate factor income shares in GDP.
5We consider ambiguous components to be proprietor's income, the statistical discrepancy, taxes on
production and imports, and the current surplus of government enterprises less subsidies. While the latter
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Bureau of Economic Analysis for 2007-2016, we ﬁrst calculate 36.17% as the joint share
of GDP for both public and private non-residential capital. We then repeat the calcula-
tion private non-residential capital only, we yields private capital's share of production
α = 0.3265. Finally, we take public capital's share of production to be the residual of the
joint share and private capital's share so that g = 0.0352.
As in Fernánez-Villaverde and Krueger (2010), rates of economic depreciation on
productive capital and housing capital are calculated using the steady state expression for
the investment to capital ratio. For productive private capital this expression is IK/K =
(ΥAΥP − 1 + δK). Solving for the depreciation rate yields δK =
(
(IK/K)−ΥAΥP + 1
)
.
Using the average annual investment ﬂows and stocks of private non-residential capital
as reported by NIPA for years 2007-2016 yields δK = 0.0799. Using the analogous
expression for public capital, which we take here to include federal, state, and local
capital, we compute δG = 0.0317 over the same period. For housing capital, we calculate
the depreciation rates using the average annual investment ﬂows and stocks of private
residential capital and consumer durables as reported by NIPA for years 2007-2016. The
expression for the owner-occupied housing capital deprecation is the same as that for
private capital, which obtains δo = 0.0555. The depreciation rate on rental housing
capital diﬀers from owner-occupied housing capital because rental housing investment
is assumed to be usable contemporaneously with investment ﬂows. For rental housing
capital, the investment to capital ratio is Ir/Hr = (ΥAΥP − 1 + δr)/(ΥAΥP ), which has
the associated depreciation rate δr = ΥAΥP ((I
r/Hr)− 1) = 0.0570.
The ﬁnancial intermediary faces quadratic costs of capital adjustment equal to Ξt =
ξK
2
(Kt+1
Kt
−ΥPΥA)2Kt. Given the rates of population growth and technological progress,
this adjustment cost function is parameterized by ξK , which for purposes of the simula-
tions is set to 6.
Following Gervais (2002), Fernánez-Villaverde and Krueger (2010), and Cho and Fran-
cis (2011), we set the minimum down-payment required on owner-occupied home pur-
chases to γ = 0.20. This ﬁgure also closely corresponds to the median loan-to-value ratio
of 77% for owner-occupied housing units manufactured between 2010-2015 as reported
in the Census Bureau's 2015 American Housing Survey. Furthermore, as in Gruber and
Martin (2003), we assume transaction costs associated with changing your housing status
unit are symmetric for buying and selling. While the authors ﬁnd median costs of 7% and
2.5% of housing value for selling and purchasing respectively, we conservatively choose
the midpoint value so that φo = φr = 0.05.
To restrict households from purchasing unfeasibly small residences, we assume there
is a lower bound on the support of rental housing hr and owner-occupied housing ho such
that 0 < hr ≤ ho. The lower bound on owner-occupied housing value is set to target
a homeownership ratio of 0.637 as reported for 2015 by the American Housing Survey.
Reﬂecting the ratio of housing to food spending for the lowest decile of households in
2016 as reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) in the Consumer Expenditure
Survey, the lower bound on rental housing value is set to be 2.525 times the average
minimum consumption levels across family composition.
three are often excluded when calculating factor income shares, we include them so that the aggregate
income-output equivalence in the model implies a level of output consistent with measured GDP.
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A.1.3 Household Characteristics and Preferences
The rate at which households discount future utility is set to target the observed private
business investment to GDP ratio of 0.162 as calculated from NIPA for 2016. We set the
subjective discount factor as β = 0.94 to target this ﬁgure under both tax systems.
Individual labor productivity zz,fj is assumed to consist of two independent compo-
nents: (i) an age-varying component zj and (ii) an age-invariant component that depends
both on productivity type and family composition zz,f , so that zz,fj ≡ zjzz,f . We let the
number of productivity types nz = 5 so that each type z approximates average annual
household labor income quintiles. Since a household of productivity type z remains that
type over their lifetime, our calibration is consistent with the notion of `lifetime' labor
earnings quintiles. This leads to a natural sorting of households by their labor income
characteristics, where we deﬁne labor income to be the sum of a NIPA-comparable wage
income concept and a (1− α− g) share of pass-through business income.6,7
To calibrate the age-varying component of labor productivity, we adopt the smoothed
numerical wage proﬁles estimated in Rupert and Zanella (2015) for all individuals, nor-
malizing the mean to unity. For the age-invariant component of labor productivity, we set
zz,f for z = {1, . . . , 5} and f = {s,m} endogenously so that average annual labor income
over ages j = {1, . . . , R} in the model matches the ITM's 2018 extrapolated values of
average annual labor income over ages 25-64 for each respective group, when in present-
law baseline equilibrium.8 While both potential workers in married households face the
same individual labor productivity term zz,fj , there is an exogenous productivity wedge
µz between primary and secondary workers. This wedge is taken to represent the hourly
earnings of secondary workers relative to primary workers, and is computed using the
total wage and business income quintiles of primary ﬁlers and their spouses as reported
by the Medical Expenditures Panel Survey (MEPS) for 2015.
Individual labor supply n is indivisible, and is assumed to correspond with either full-
time employment nFT , part-time employment nPT , or unemployment. Following the BLS,
we consider full-time employment to correspond with at least 35 weekly hours of work and
part-time employment to correspond with at least 1 but no more than 34 weekly hours
of work. Using data from the BLS, we ﬁnd that in 2016 the median full-time and part-
time employees work 44.4 and 22.4 hours per week respectively, which are equivalent to
about 2310 and 1163 working hours per year. As the BLS reports in the 2016 American
Time Use Survey that the average individual spends about 3208.4 hours sleeping per
year, full-time and part-time work correspond with 41.6% and 21.0% of waking hours
spent working. We therefore normalize individual total time endowments to unity, and
set nFT = 0.416 and nPT = 0.210.
The labor disutility coeﬃcients ψs, ψm,1, ψm,2, and ﬁxed cost of employment param-
eters φs, φm, are set so that model-generated lifecycle labor supply approximates the
6The BEA does not report distributional characteristics of NIPA wage income. To approximate
the desired NIPA wage income quintiles, we derive a `NIPA-comparable' measure using the ITM by
adding to AGI wage income (i) combat pay, (ii) employers' share of the FICA tax, (iii) deferred 401k
compensation, (iv) employers share of 401k compensation, (v) employer provided dependent care, (vi)
employer health-insurance compensation, (vii) employer HSA compensation, and (viii) employer life-
insurance compensation. See Ledbetter (2007) for a comparison of AGI income and NIPA income.
7The pass-through business income considered here includes income ﬂows from sole proprietorship,
partnerships, S-corporations, estates and trusts, and rents and royalties.
8To match the demographics explicitly modeled, we restrict our attention to households of these ages
who are not receiving retirement income, e.g. 401(k), IRA, pension, or social security income.
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distribution of employment status by earner type  single, married primary, or married
secondary  as observed in the MEPS for 2015 and reported in Table A1.9 The ﬁxed
cost of employment parameter largely determines the workforce participation rate. The
extensive margin elasticity, which determines the sensitivity of workers moving into or
out of employment in response to changes in the after-tax wage rate, is determined en-
dogenously by the distribution of reservation wages which itself partially depends on the
ﬁxed costs associated with working.
The intensive margin elasticity, which determines the sensitivity of workers choosing
to supply more or less hours of work in response to changes in the after-tax wage rate
conditional on already being employed, depends on the utility function curvature pa-
rameters ζs, ζm,1, ζm,2 only in models of continuous labor choice. In models of discrete
labor choice such as the one used here, Chang et al. (2011) show that these parameters
are largely unrelated to the intensive margin elasticity. Rogerson and Wallenius (2009)
and Keane and Rogerson (2012) show that higher values of these parameters imply that
aggregate employment ﬂuctuations depend more heavily on changes in the duration of
working life, rather than changes in hours worked while employed. Estimated elasticities
for secondary earners from their model simulation are systematically higher despite hav-
ing the same curvature parameter as the primary earner. Perhaps most importantly for
calibration purposes, movement along the intensive margin should account for one-third
of aggregate employment ﬂuctuations on average over 1970-2009, see Fiorito and Zanella
(2012). Taking this into consideration, we choose the same relatively high uniform value
for workers and set ζs = ζm,1 = ζm,2 = 5.
The amount of hours spent on home production have a ﬁxed, inverse relationship to
the amount of labor hours. We used the 2016 American Time Use Survey10 to ﬁnd the
average housework hours11 for full time, part time, and unemployed individuals. Full time
workers reported spending 0.62 hours per day, part time workers reported 1.52 hours per
day, and unemployed individuals reported 1.73 hours. Normalizing available (non-sleep)
time to unity yields the following mapping for home work time as a function of labor
hours for singles and each married individual:
N = [0.000, 0.210, 0.416]→ Nh = [0.114, 0.100, 0.041]
Empirically, the value of home production has been measured by multiplying hours
spent on housework by the wage rate of domestic workers, see Bridgman (2016). We take
a similar approach to calculating the value of home production as a function of non-work
hours:
9MEPS reports the employment status of each individual in a married household, but does not specify
who is the primary earner. Rather than erroneously using gender as an indicator of primary or secondary
earnings status, we consider the amount of hours worked. If both individuals are unemployed, we consider
the primary earner to be the one who is unemployed. If both individuals are working part time, or one
is working part time and one is unemployed, we consider the primary earner to be the one employed
part time. Lastly, if at least one earner is employed full time, we consider the primary earner to be the
one employed full time. BLS consistent deﬁnitions of full-time, part-time and unemployed are used in
construction of these targets.
10Sandra L. Hoﬀerth, Sarah M. Flood, and Matthew Sobek. American Time Use Survey Data Extract
Builder: Version 2.6. College Park, MD: University of Maryland and Minneapolis, MN: University of
Minnesota, 2017. https://doi.org/10.18128/D060.V2.6.
11We summed four variables for home work averages: housework, food prep and cleanup, interior
maintenance and exterior maintenance. We chose variables that can be reasonably outsourced for pay,
and sounded most like chores, rather than hobbies or leisure activities.
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ch(nhj ) =
{
wtz¯
1,snhj if f = s
wtz¯
1,s(nh,1j + n
h,2
j ) if f = m
where wtz¯
1,s is the average wage rate for the lowest productivity type single household.
Childcare expenses take the form κz,fj ≡ ccz,fνz,fj nj, where labor supply is evaluated
at the quantity supplied by the secondary worker for married households. Given the
average number of dependents under 13 within a household νz,fj , we set the childcare cost
scale parameter ccz,f exogenously so that childcare expenses on average for each (z, f)
demographic when labor supply is evaluated as the employment targets discussed above
match those values imputed by the ITM for 2018.
Given the speciﬁcation of the non-housing consumption composite in equation (2.8),
the relative optimal quantities of ordinary consumption and charitable giving can be
expressed for those households not itemizing tax deductions as:
cgj
cij
=
(
1− θz,f
θz,f
)
Let (c¯g/¯i)z,f denote average charitable giving as a proportion of labor income targets for
each (z, f) combination as computed from the ITM for 2018. Then the consumption
composite function can be parameterized endogenously by setting θz,f such that:
θz,f =
(
1 + (c¯g/¯i)z,f
∑R
j=1 i
z,f
j∑R
j=1 c
i;z,f
j
)−1
which implies that in baseline equilibrium the model reproduces charitable giving targets
on average for the working-age population.
The elasticity of substitution between housing and non-housing consumption is set
to η = 0.487 as estimated by Li et al. (2016). The non-housing consumption preference
parameter σ is set to target the ratio of private business investment to total private invest-
ment of 0.465 as calculated from the 2016 NIPA. The lower bound on permissible ordinary
consumption levels ci is set to be an arbitrary 5% larger than the maximum amount of
home production consumption that may be obtained from choosing unemployment so
that this constraint can potentially bind.
A.1.4 Government: Public Capital and Debt
Productive public capital held by the federal government and the state and local govern-
ment are both set endogenously so that in present-law baseline they exhibit a value of
18.4% and 55.1% respectively of aggregate output. This value reﬂects an average over
2007-2016 from NIPA. Given this target, and the assumption that public capital remains
ﬁxed under proposed law simulations, the level of investment in public capital can be
computed from the equation of motion.
The CBO projects that federal debt held by the public less ﬁnancial assets relative to
GDP will grow from 65.7% in ﬁscal year 2018 to 84.0% in ﬁscal year 2028. Because of this
large projected increase we calibrate federal debt held by the public in the present-law
baseline so that is it approximately 74.6% of aggregate output, the average projected
value over ﬁscal years 2028-2028. Furthermore, the United States Treasury reports in
the December 2017 Treasury Bulletin that 21.7% of debt held by the public was held by
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Federal Reserve Banks at the beginning of ﬁscal year 2018. Since this portion of public
debt does not necessarily crowd out private capital, we endogenously set the net stock
of government debt, B, in the present-law baseline so that its level relative to aggregate
output is approximately 58.4%.
It is also projected by the CBO that net interest payments on federal debt relative
to GDP will be growing over ﬁscal years 2018-2028. We therefore endogenously set the
wedge between rate of return to private capital and government debt, $, so that net
interest payments relative to output match the average projected value of 2.60% over
this time period.
A.2 Endowment Heterogeneity
As shown in Hugget et al. (2011) for models of this class, diﬀerences in initial wealth
contribute to a substantial portion diﬀerences in lifetime wealth. To account for this
relationship we introduce variation in endowments of initial ﬁnancial wealth a1 over each
demographic, which is indexed by e = {1, . . . , ne} ∈ E.
To specify beginning-of-period endowments for households entering the economy at
age j = 1, we draw ratios of ﬁnancial wealth to labor income, Af , from the following
distribution:12
sinh−1
(
Af
) ∼ N (µf , σ2;f)
where µf and σ2;f are taken to be the sample mean and variance of the inverse hy-
perbolic sine of ﬁnancial wealth to labor income ratios for single and married families
headed by a 25 year old in the Survey of Consumer Finances for 2013, respectively
x¯f = {−0.0439, 0.0045} and s2;f = {0.7464, 0.6153}.13 Letting i¯z,f denote the average
lifetime labor income targets, and zj be the age-varying component of individual labor
productivity, we take the product i¯z,fz1 as an approximation of average labor income for
the youngest cohort of households. Treating single and married households as separate
distributions, we take ne = 40 random draws of Af for each productivity type, we obtain
initial endowments of ﬁnancial wealth:
ae,z,f1 = A
fz1
(
i¯z,f
i¯nz,f
)
where the denominator on the right-hand side normalizes initial endowments by the av-
erage labor income of the highest productivity type. Furthermore, we take the minimum
drawn value of endowments for each labor productivity type z and family composition f
as the lower-bound of wealth support for the respective demographic:
yz,f = arg min(ae,z,f1 )
While this variation in endowment level does not change the dynamic optimization
12 We choose the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation to approximate a natural log transformation
while allowing for negative values. See Pence (2006) for a discussion.
13We deﬁne ﬁnancial wealth as ﬁnancial assets (balances of checking accounts, savings accounts, money
market mutual accounts, call accounts at brokerages, prepaid cards, certiﬁcates of deposits, total directly-
held mutual funds, stocks, savings and other bonds, IRAs, thrift accounts, future pensions, cash value
of whole life insurance, trusts, annuities, managed investment accounts with equity interest and miscel-
laneous other ﬁnancial assets) less debt (credit card balances, educations loans, installment loans, loans
against pensions and/or life insurance, margin loans and other miscellaneous loans).
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problem, endowment heterogeneity does add an additional layer of aggregation such that
for any variable x:
xz,ft,j =
∫
E
xz,f,et,j Ω
e de
where Ωe = 1
ne
is the measure of endowment level e. Therefore in each year of the
simulation, nf×nz×ne households enter the model. This level of aggregation is implicit
in Appendix B.3.
B Dynamic Programming Problem
B.1 Stationarity
Along a steady-state balanced growth path, aggregate and individual variables will be
growing at a constant rate. In order to apply numerical solution techniques for stationary
economies we express these variables in trend-stationary form to adjust for the source
of growth, which could be either population growth, technological progress, or both.14
Letting the tilde accent denote a variable transformed to stationary form, Table A4 lists
selected growth-adjusted variables.
Consider aggregate labor supply, N , which in a steady state will be growing due to
population growth. While aggregate labor supply will therefore be growing at a rate
of υP , the stationary variable N˜ will be constant. Every other aggregate variable will
be growing in a steady state due to both population growth and technological progress.
Therefore, they can be made stationary by dividing each with the product AP. While
each of these non-stationary aggregates will be growing at the rate of υP +υA in a steady
state, the stationary variable will be constant.
The measure of households' age and productivity, Ω, will be growing at a rate of υP
due solely to population growth, and therefore can be made stationary by dividing by the
total population. Every other individual variable grows at a rate of υA in a steady state
due solely to technological progress. These variables can therefore be made stationary by
dividing each with the level of technology.
B.2 Stationary Recursive Formulation
The model described in Section 2 can be expressed as a trend stationary dynamic program.
We formulate the problem from the perspective of households who take prices, bequests,
and government policy as given. In each period of their life, households compare the
indirect utility generated by decisions associated with owning a home against the welfare
generated by decisions associated with renting:
V z,ft,j (y˜j) = max{V o;z,ft,j ,V r;z,ft,j } (B.1)
where V o;z,ft,j and V
r;z,f
t,j are the current period value functions associated with owning
and renting respectively for a household of demographic (j, z, f).
14See King et al. (2002) for a detailed discussion of trend stationarity.
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The value function for a household that will be a homeowner in period t is:
V o;z,ft,j (y˜j) =

max
y˜j+1;x˜j ,nj∈N
Uo;z,st,j (x˜j, nj) + βpijV
z,s
t+1,j+1(y˜j+1) if f = s
max
y˜j+1;x˜j ,n1j ,n
2
j∈N
Uo;z,mt,j (x˜j, n
1
j , n
2
j) + βpijV
z,m
t+1,j+1(y˜j+1) if f = m
(B.2)
where:
Uo;z,ft,j ≡

max
cij ,c
g
j ,h
o
j
log(x˜j)− ψs n
1+ζs
j
1+ζs
− F s if f = s
max
cij ,c
g
j ,h
o
j
log(x˜j)− ψm,1 (n
1
j )
1+ζm,1
1+ζm,1
− ψm,2 (n2j )1+ζ
m,2
1+ζm,2
− Fm if f = m
(B.3)
x˜j ≡
(
σc˜ηj + (1− σ)(h˜oj)η
)1/η
(B.4)
As a subset of the full set of constraints for this optimization problem, the household
considering being a homeowner in period t faces:
c˜Mj + c˜
g
j + (r
p
t + δ
o) h˜oj + y˜j+1ΥA ≤ (1 + rpt ) y˜j + ˜beqt + i˜z,ft,j −T˜ z,ft,j − κ˜z,fj −φrh˜rj+1ΥA (B.5)
h˜oj ≥ h˜
o
(B.6)
y˜j ≥ γh˜oj (B.7)
h˜rj = 0 (B.8)
The value function for a household that will be a renter takes the form:
V r;z,ft,j (y˜j) =

max
y˜j+1;x˜j ,nj∈N
U r;z,st,j (x˜j, nj) + βpijV
z,s
t+1,j+1(y˜j+1) if f = s
max
y˜j+1;x˜j ,n1j ,n
2
j∈N
U r;z,mt,j (x˜j, n
1
j , n
2
j) + βpijV
z,m
t+1,j+1(y˜j+1) if f = m
(B.9)
where:
U r;z,ft,j ≡

max
cij ,c
g
j ,h
r
j
log(x˜j)− ψs n
1+ζs
j
1+ζs
− F s if f = s
max
cij ,c
g
j ,h
r
j
log(x˜j)− ψm,1 (n
1
j )
1+ζm,1
1+ζm,1
− ψm,2 (n2j )1+ζ
m,2
1+ζm,2
− Fm if f = m
(B.10)
x˜j ≡
(
σc˜ηj + (1− σ)(h˜rj)η
)1/η
(B.11)
As a subset of the full set of constraints for this optimization problem, the household
considering being a renter in period t faces:
c˜Mj + c˜
g
j + p
r
t h˜
r
j + y˜j+1ΥA ≤ (1 + rpt ) y˜j + ˜beqt + i˜z,ft,j − T˜ z,ft,j − φoh˜oj+1ΥA − κ˜z,fj (B.12)
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h˜rj ≥ h˜
r
(B.13)
y˜j ≥ y˜z,f (B.14)
h˜oj = 0 (B.15)
Regardless of residential status, all households face the following equality and inequal-
ity constraints, employment ﬁxed and variable costs, and initial and terminal conditions:
y˜j ≡ h˜oj + a˜j (B.16)
c˜j ≡ (c˜ij)θ
z,f
(c˜gj )
(1−θz,f ) (B.17)
nj =
{
1− lj − nhj (nj) ∀j ≤ R
0 ∀j > R  = 1, 2 (B.18)
i˜z,ft,j ≡
{
njw˜tz
z,s
j + s˜s
z,s
j if f = s
(n1j + µ
zn2j)w˜tz
z,m
j + s˜s
z,m
j if f = m
(B.19)
κ˜z,fj =
{
c˜cz,sνz,sj nj if f = s
c˜cz,mνz,mj n
2
j if f = m
(B.20)
F s =
{
φs nj > 0
0 nj = 0
(B.21)
Fm =
{
φm n2j > 0
0 n2j = 0
(B.22)
c˜ij ≡
{
c˜Mj + c˜
h
j (n
h
j ) if f = s
c˜Mj + c˜
h,2
j (n
h,1
j ) + c˜
h,1
j (n
h,2
j ) if f = m
(B.23)
T˜ z,ft,j ≡ ˜taxz,ft,j + τat rpt ˆ˜az,ft,j + τ prt ˆ˜iz,ft,j − ( ˜trwz,ft,j + ˜trlt − ˜lstt) + (τ slt ˆ˜iz,ft,j + τ slpt h˜ot,j) (B.24)
c˜ij ≥ c˜i (B.25)
c˜j = c˜
i
j if c˜
i
j = c˜
i (B.26)
y˜1 = a˜1 (B.27)
h˜o1 = y˜J+1 = 0 (B.28)
V z,ft,J+1 = 0 (B.29)
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B.3 Equilibrium
For each household age cohort, j, productivity type, z, and family composition f , house-
holds have ordinary consumption, c˜i, charitable giving, c˜g, market labor hours, n, n1, and
n2, owner-occupied housing services consumption, h˜o, rental housing services consump-
tion h˜r, and future net worth y˜′, as control variables. Households have current net worth
y˜ as their endogenous individual state variable, and their age, productivity type, as fam-
ily composition as their exogenous state variables. Endogenous aggregate state variables
are eﬀective market labor supply N˜ , owner-occupied housing capital H˜o, rental housing
capital H˜r, deposits D˜, private business capital K˜, public capital G˜, federal government
debt B˜, and federal, state, and local tax instruments and transfer payments associated
with given tax system, the set of which are denoted by T. Then:
Deﬁnition 1. A perfect-foresight stationary recursive equilibrium is comprised
of a measure of households Ω˜z,ft,j , a value function V
z,f
t,j (y˜), a collection of household de-
cision rules {c˜i;z,ft,j (y˜), c˜g;z,ft,j (y˜), nz,st,j (y˜), nz,m,1t,j (y˜), nz,m,2t,j (y˜), h˜o;z,ft,j (y˜), h˜r;z,ft,j (y˜), y˜z,ft+1,j+1(y˜);
a˜z,ft,j (y˜), c˜
h;z,f
t,j (y˜) }, prices {w˜t, rt, prt , ρt, rpt }, aggregates {N˜t, H˜ot , H˜rt , D˜t, K˜t, G˜t, B˜t; C˜t, I˜t, G˜t},
and the set of tax instruments and transfers T associated with given tax system such that:
1. Household decision rules are the solutions to the constrained optimization problem
in equations (B.1)-(B.29).
2. Macroeconomic aggregates are consistent with household behavior such that:
N˜t =
∫
Z
∫
J
Ω˜z,st,j z
z,s
j n
z,s
t,j (y˜) + Ω˜
z,m
t,j z
z,m
j
(
nz,1t,j (y˜) + n
z,2
t,j (y˜)
)
dj dz
H˜ot =
∫
Z
∫
J
∑
f=s,m
Ω˜z,ft,j h˜
o;z,f
t,j (y˜) dj dz
H˜rt =
∫
Z
∫
J
∑
f=s,m
Ω˜z,ft,j h˜
r;z,f
t,j (y˜) dj dz
D˜t =
∫
Z
∫
J
∑
f=s,m
Ω˜z,ft,j a˜
z,f
t,j (y˜) dj dz
C˜t =
∫
Z
∫
J
∑
f=s,m
Ω˜z,ft,j
(
(c˜i;z,ft,j (y˜)− c˜h;z,ft,j (y˜)) + c˜g;z,ft,j (y˜) + κz,ft,j
)
dj dz + c˜eolt
3. Firms hire private factors of production to produce output at proﬁt-maximizing levels
while taking public capital and factor prices consistent with the following as given:
w˜t = (1− α− g)G˜gt K˜αt N˜−α−gt
rt = K˜
−1
t
(
(1− τ bust )(1− τ slbt )(α + g)(G˜gt K˜αt (AtNt)1−α−g) + τ bust ˜lsd
bus
t
)
4. The asset market clears such that:
D˜t+1 = K˜t+1 + H˜
r
t (ΥPΥA)
−1 + B˜t+1
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where the ﬁnancial intermediary optimally allocates deposits into productive private
capital and rental housing so that the following no-arbitrage condition holds:
prt = rt+1 − δK + δr −
(
∂Ξ˜t
∂K˜t+1
+
∂Ξ˜t+1
∂K˜t+1
)
and is willing to accept `safe-asset' pricing of federal government bonds so that:
ρt = rt −$
Furthermore, the rate of return paid to households on deposits is determined by
application of a zero proﬁt condition so that:
rpt = D˜
−1
t
(
(rt − δK)K˜t − Ξ˜t + ptH˜rt − δrH˜rt−1(ΥPΥA)−1 + ρtB˜t
)
5. The goods market clears such that:
F (G˜, K˜t, N˜t) = C˜t + I˜t + G˜t
where private aggregate investment is deﬁned as:
I˜t ≡ I˜Kt + I˜ot + I˜rt + Φ˜Ht
with:
I˜Kt = K˜t+1(ΥPΥA)− (1− δK)K˜t + Ξt
I˜ot = H˜
o
t+1(ΥPΥA)− (1− δo)H˜ot
I˜rt = H˜
r
t − (1− δr)H˜rt−1(ΥPΥA)−1
Φ˜Ht =
∫
Z
∫
J
∑
f=s,m
Ω˜z,ft,j
(
φoh˜o;z,ft+1,j+1(y˜) + φ
rh˜r;z,ft+1,j+1(y˜)
)
dj dz
and where aggregate government expenditures is deﬁned as:
G˜t ≡ C˜fedt + C˜slt + I˜fedt + I˜slt
with:
I˜fedt = G˜
fed
t+1(ΥPΥA)− (1− δg)G˜slt
I˜slt = G˜
sl
t+1(ΥPΥA)− (1− δg)G˜slt
6. The federal government's debt follows the law of motion:
B˜t+1(ΥPΥA) = C˜
fed
t + I˜
fed
t − (T˜ hht + T˜ bust + T˜ beqt ) + (1 + ρt)B˜t
and maintains a ﬁscally sustainable path so that:
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lim
k→∞
B˜t+k∏k−1
s=0(1 + ρt+s)
= 0
where net federal tax receipts from households, ﬁrms, and bequests are:
T˜ hht =
∫
Z
∫
J
∑
f=s,m
Ω˜z,ft,j
(
˜tax
z,f
t,j +τ
a
t r
p
t
ˆ˜az,ft,j +τ
pr
t
ˆ˜iz,ft,j −( ˜trwz,ft,j + ˜trlt− ˜lstt)−s˜sz,ft,j
)
dj dz
T˜ bust = τ
bus
t
(
(1− τ slbt )(Y˜t − w˜tN˜t)− ˜lsd
bus
t
)
T˜ beqt = τ
beq
t (1− Λ) (ΥA)
∫
Z
∫
J
(1− pij)
∑
f=s,m
Ω˜z,ft,j y˜t+1,j+1 dj dz
7. The state and local composite government maintains a balanced budget:
T˜ slht + T˜
slb
t = C˜
sl
t + I˜
sl
t
where net state and local tax receipts from households and ﬁrms are:
T˜ slht =
∫
Z
∫
J
∑
f=s,m
Ω˜z,ft,j (τ
sl
t
ˆ˜iz,ft,j + τ
slp
t h˜
o
t,j) dj dz
T˜ slbt = τ
slb
t
(
Y˜t − w˜tN˜t
)
8. The measure of households is time-invariant:
Ω˜z,ft+1,j = Ω˜
z,f
t,j
9. The net worth of households that die before reaching the maximum age J is allocated
to end-of-life consumption expenditures to bequests among the living such that:
c˜eolt = Λ (ΥA)
∫
Z
∫
J
(1− pij)
∑
f=s,m
Ω˜z,ft,j y˜t+1,j+1 dj dz
˜beqt = (1− τ beqt )(1− Λ) (ΥA)
∫
Z
∫
J
(1− pij)
∑
f=s,m
Ω˜z,ft,j y˜t+1,j+1 dj dz
Deﬁnition 2. A steady-state perfect-foresight stationary recursive equilibrium
is a perfect-foresight stationary recursive equilibrium, where every growth-adjusted aggre-
gate variable is time invariant.
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C Description of Solution Algorithm
C.1 Steady State
1. Given the set of tax instruments and transfers T and a starting guess for acci-
dental bequests ˜beqt, make a guess for the set of endogenous aggregate state vari-
ables {N˜t, H˜ot , H˜rt , D˜t, K˜t, G˜t, B˜t}, and use these guesses to compute the of prices
{w˜t, rt, prt , ρt, rpt }.
2. For each household family composition f = s,m and labor productivity type z ∈ Z,
obtain the optimal household decision rules associated with the value function in
equation (B.1) at each age j ∈ J by backwards recursive iterations, subject to
equations (B.2)-(B.29):
(a) Beginning with the maximum age J , analytically compute the optimal choices
of housing, ordinary consumption, and charitable giving in terms of a grid of
discrete values for current net worth y˜J , both for the optimization problem
particular to current period renters and homeowners as described in Section
B.2.15 Use these choices to compute the value functions associated with renters
and homeowners respectively, setting the value function to a large negative
number for those choices that violate inequality constraints. For each net
worth node, set V z,ft,J (y˜J) equal to the maximum of V
o;z,f
t,J and V
r;z,f
t,J . Store
the household choices associated with the optimal housing status at each net
worth node.
(b) For ages j ∈ {J − 1, . . . , 1}, repeat part (a) for every possible (y˜j, y˜j+1) com-
bination of net worth nodes to obtain the optimal household choices each age.
3. Use the optimal household decision rules obtained from the previous step to simulate
lifecycle choices for each demographic with the initial conditions for net worth of
y˜1 = a˜1 and owner-occupied housing h˜
o
1 = 0. Simulation includes ne endowment
levels from each demographic for a total of nf ×nz×J ×ne simulations. Compute
all aggregates and implied prices.
4. Compare the new set of aggregates {N˜t, H˜ot , H˜rt , D˜t, K˜t, G˜t, B˜t} and accidental be-
quests ˜beqt to the initial guesses. If the value of these new aggregates are suﬃciently
close to the guessed values, then a steady-state equilibrium is obtained and the pro-
gram can be terminated. If not, update each guess by taking a linear combination
of the original guess and the new value obtained from application of equilibrium
conditions. Use these new guesses to compute new values for the set of prices
{w˜t, rt, prt , ρt, rpt }. Return to step 2.
15Since the model is solved backwards, optimal choices for a household aged j + 1 are known before
those of a household aged j. Therefore h˜ot,j+1 and c˜
g
t,j+1 are used as proxies for h˜
o
t,j and c˜
g
t,j for purposes of
computing itemized tax deductions during the optimization step. This allows for a substantial reduction
in computational burden by avoiding a search over some speciﬁed support for h˜o and c˜g in addition to the
search needed over labor supply in order to know iz,ft,j for the working-age population. The approximation
error introduced by this proxy is limited both the share of households which itemize tax deductions, and
the lifecycle smooth path of these variables.
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C.2 Transition Path
1. Choose the number of transition periods, tp, suﬃciently large so that the economy
reaches a steady state following a policy change.
2. Compute the initial steady state for the policy baseline and the ﬁnal steady state
under the new policy.
3. Provide an initial guess for the time path of the set of aggregate variables.
4. Compute the transition path.
(a) For years before policy change, use decision rules from steady state.
(b) Starting the ﬁrst year of policy change, compute new decision rules for agents
of each demographic for the price guesses for that time period.
(c) Run simulation starting J years before policy change so that by the ﬁrst tran-
sition year, there are J ages. Use new decision rules and price guesses to
simulate forward tp periods.
(d) Compute new aggregates and prices for each time period.
5. Compare the initial guess for the time path of the aggregate variables to their new
time path obtained from the previous step. If time paths are suﬃciently close,
terminate the program. If not, update the guesses by taking a linear combination
of the new time path and the old time path. Return to Step 4.
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D Tables
Table A1: Targeted and Baseline Actual Employment Status by Type of Worker
Type of Worker Data Model: ITC Model: BTF
FT PT U FT PT U FT PT U
Single 0.61 0.24 0.15 0.61 0.24 0.15 0.62 0.24 0.15
Married Primary 0.90 0.08 0.25 0.90 0.10 0.00 0.91 0.09 0.00
Married Secondary 0.42 0.32 0.26 0.42 0.32 0.26 0.43 0.33 0.25
Totals may not sum to 1 due to rounding
Table A2: Targeted and Baseline Actual Aggregate Ratios
Target Ratio Data Model: ITC Model: BTF
Homeownership ratio 0.64 0.65 0.65
Private business investment to
total private investment ratio 0.47 0.47 0.47
Private business investment to
output ratio 0.16 0.17 0.17
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Table A3: Select Exogenous Parameters
Demographics
Terminal ages R, J 40, 66
Rate of population growth υP 0.0075
Production
Rate of technological progress υA 0.0118
Private capital share of output α 0.3265
Public capital share of output g 0.0352
Private capital depreciation rate δK 0.0799
Private capital adjustment cost parameter ξK 6
Housing
Owner-occupied housing minimum down-payment γ 0.20
Housing status adjustment cost φo, φr 0.05, 0.05
Housing services depreciation rate δo, δr 0.0555, 0.0570
Owner-occupied housing minimum (ITC) ho 1.22
Owner-occupied housing minimum(BTF) ho 1.14
Preferences
Subjective discount factor β 0.940
Non-housing consumption share of composite σ 0.187
Housing/non-housing consumption substitution elasticity η 0.487
Utility curvature parameter ζf, 5
Intensive labor margin disutility (ITC) ψs,ψm,1,ψm,2 395.1, 264.6, 176.7
Intensive labor margin disutility (BTF) ψs,ψm,1,ψm,2 396.3, 279.9, 177.6
Extensive labor margin ﬁxed cost (ITC) φs, φm 0.354, 0.155
Extensive labor margin ﬁxed cost (BTF) φs, φm 0.393, 0.151
Government
Public capital depreciation rate δg 0.0317
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Table A4: Trend Stationary Transformations for Selected Variables
Aggregate Variables:
C˜it ≡
Cit
AtPt
H˜ot ≡
Hot
AtPt
H˜rt ≡
Hrt
AtPt
D˜t ≡ Dt
AtPt
K˜t ≡ Kt
AtPt
C˜gt ≡
Cgt
AtPt
B˜t ≡ Bt
AtPt
G˜t ≡ Gt
AtPt
T˜t ≡ Tt
AtPt
N˜t ≡ Nt
Pt
Individual Variables:
c˜it ≡
ct
At
h˜ot ≡
hot
At
h˜rt ≡
hrt
At
c˜gt ≡
cgt
At
a˜t ≡ at
At
y˜t ≡ yt
At
i˜t ≡ it
At
T˜t ≡ Tt
At
˜trst ≡ trst
At
s˜st ≡ sst
At
˜taxt ≡ taxt
At
˜beqt ≡
beqt
At
w˜t ≡ wt
At
Ω˜t ≡ Ωt
Pt
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